4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Shareholder Value

4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Shareholder Value

ADI IGNATIUS: Welcome to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World, a special series of the HBR IdeaCast. The debate over how much control to give to shareholders has existed for as long as there have been any. The very first firm with publicly traded shares, the Dutch East India Company in the 17th century, pretty quickly fielded complaints from angry stock owners who felt that the company was being run counter to their wishes. And in the ensuing centuries, managers and owners would tussle endlessly over the questions of ownership and control.

Until the 1970s, that is, when the notion of shareholder primacy the idea that maximizing shareholder value takes legal and practical precedence above all else came to prominence. The person who arguably did the most to advance the idea was Michael Jensen, a professor at the University of Rochester Business School and later, a Harvard Business School professor with a coauthor he wrote in Harvard Business Review and elsewhere, he argued for, among other things, stock-based incentives that would neatly align CEO and shareholder interests, maximizing shareholder value became the mantra for every Fortune 500 CEO, achieve it or risk being pushed aside.

Critics have long charged that maximizing shareholder value ultimately just encourages CEOs and shareholders to feather their own nests at the expense of everything else, jobs, wages and benefits, communities, the environment. Now the past few years have seen a backlash against shareholder capitalism and the rise of so-called stakeholder capitalism.

So, in this special series from HBR IdeaCast, we’re exploring 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World. Each week, for four weeks, we’ll be talking to scholars and experts on the most influential ideas of HBR’s first 100 years. This week, it’s shareholder value. With me to discuss the issue are Lynn Paine and Mihir Desai, professors at Harvard Business School, and Carola Frydman, corporate historian at Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. I’m Adi Ignatius, editor in chief of Harvard Business Review, and your host for this episode.

Carola, let me start with you, you’re the historian. Let’s say 100 years ago, this is at the time of HBR’s founding, you had a boom in business. There were more businesses, more managers. There were more shareholders. What kind of dynamic was forming then between a firm’s shareholders and its management?

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Well, let me take us a little bit further back to set the stage. So, if you were to drop in the 1850s, in the U.S. economy, what you would have found is every local town had firms producing almost everything, and the owner and the manager of those firms were one on the same. So, what changes, setting the stage up to the 1920s is that the economy gets bigger, and firms get much bigger. The rise of the railroad is a big transformation. And these larger firms need a lot of capital. So, one person just cannot provide all the financing that these firms need, and so we’re starting to see lots of shareholders start funding these firms. So, the structure of firms changes from having one owner be the manager, to having lots and lots of owners and having professional managers.

So, what emerges is what we would call a separation of ownership from control. That those that own the firms that are going to get the cash flows are no longer the same people making the day-to-day decisions for those firms. And that is essentially what’s happening in the 1920s. We see a big rise in the stock market, nothing like what we see today. So, I would say roughly by the late 1920s, probably about 15{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550} of households had one share or more. They actually have very limited rights, and they have very limited information about what the firms are doing. So, we started seeing the tension between shareholders and management emerge. All of this is setting the stage for what’s going to come a little bit later into the mid-20th century.

ADI IGNATIUS: Lynn, so what interests were companies serving then? Was there a philosophy back then as to how to prioritize these interests?

LYNN PAINE: Well, you know, it’s so interesting listening to Carola talk about the history of the rise of the big corporation. Even as early as the 1920s, there was already a growing debate about whose interests this corporation should serve. There was real concern about the power of these large concentrations of capital.

That showed up in print in the early 1930s in a really famous debate between Columbia Professor Adolf Berle and Harvard Law School Professor Merrick Dodd. Berle argued that managers were what he called the attorney for the shareholders. Dodd took the position that, no, managers are trustees, and they’re trustees of the corporate institution, and they have responsibilities to multiple constituencies. We didn’t have the word stakeholder back (laughs) then, of course. He named them constituencies, customers, employees, the shareholders, of course, and the general public.

But then in 1954, Professor Berle wrote a book called The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, in which he said, the argument had actually been settled in favor of Professor Dodd. That is, that managers were trustees of the institution with multiple responsibilities. But an interesting caveat, he says that the debate has been settled, “at least for the time being.” And it wasn’t very long before that debate was opened up again.

ADI IGNATIUS: That’s really interesting. So, Mihir, you know, as business expands when stock ownership is spread so widely among people and entities, you know, what is happening to the notion of share ownership and the understanding of what power and authority that gives to the shareholders?

MIHIR DESAI: Yeah, I think exactly as Carola and Lynn described, you know, that diffusion of ownership has these great advantages. It enables scale, as Carola suggested. It also enables lots of risk sharing, because you no longer just own your firm and are subject to the whimsies of the firm, you own shares of lots of things. But the primary issue is the one that Carola identified, which is the separation of ownership and control. And that is really a deep problem, and it’s worth just underscoring here.

Which is, the debate now becomes about the degree to which that collective action problem needs to be solved. And by collective action problem, I mean, “Well, now we have diffuse owners. Who’s going to be watching the managers?” And that is the genesis of all this, is there, what we would call a corporate governance problem today now. Which is, how do I make sure that the people who I’ve appointed to do the work will do the work correctly?

And that kind of really becomes manifest, especially in the ’50s and ’60s, which, you know, as Lynn suggested, perhaps got settled, for some. The nature of economic activities started to change and we saw the rise of conglomerates. One of the reactions to the separation of ownership and control and the diffusion of ownership is, in some sense, the rise of managerial power.

And that becomes manifest in these larger entities, which are really remarkable by modern standards. You know, we’ve kind of forgotten about them, but things like ITT, and Gulf and Western, which used that diffusion of ownership to create little empires. ITT would kind of start in a base of telecommunications, but then diversify into Wonder Bread, and rental cars, and hotels. All because the underlying premise being that these managers knew what they were doing, and they had the ability to manage capital broadly for their shareholders, and their shareholders were sufficiently diffuse, to not really be able to stop them. So, that sets the stage for a reaction by people who become worried that shareholders are actually not being served.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, I want to get to that reaction in a second. But Carola, if I can bring you back. You know, there’s this sense, this idealized, maybe, idea that corporations existed, [that] they were more paternal than they would become later. That companies were essentially company towns, and that people thought about stakeholders, again, as Lynn said without using that word, more than they did kind of narrowly about shareholders. Is that even an accurate characterization of, let’s say, the period between you know the 1920s and the 1970s?

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Not fully. There are lots of forces that are changing over the period that put pressure on managers to behave in certain ways, even if their objective is to maximize value. For example, one of the changes that starts putting a lot of pressure on managers are unions, that not only grow larger but become more powerful in the ’30s and ’40s. For a variety of reasons, including, for example, the scarcity of labor during World War II.

And so, there are many firms that have unionized workforces at the time. There are also many firms that don’t. And what you see is in the firms that do not have unionized workforces, they start doing what it’s called, at the time, “welfare capitalism.” Building cities, for example, providing all kinds of benefits to the workforce. They’re not necessarily doing it because they think it’s the right thing to do from a moral standpoint. They’re doing it because by providing those benefits, those social benefits, they’re trying to preempt the workforce from getting unionized in the first place, which they see as a bigger constraint. It’s a larger cost.

When you read business histories of specific companies, the managers are very much mindful that maximizing profits, maximizing value is important. But given the constraints at the time, they need to make investments that, in this particular case, ended up raising wages, giving benefits to other stakeholders.

ADI IGNATIUS: Yeah. All right, well, so let’s fast forward to the 1970s. So, what was happening that set the stage for this, you know, blossoming idea of shareholder value maximization? Mihir, do you want to take the first crack at that?

MIHIR DESAI: Sure. So, you know, for starters, I think there was some disappointment with this notion of conglomerates. And then, of course, in the early 1970s, we have a set of economic shocks, oil shocks, and something that now has become current, again, which is inflation. And in the early 1970s, there were two to three years of very scarring stock returns. You know, 20{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550} down after 25{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550} down. And that I think, really forced people to ask questions about the degree to which were companies in their current form actually serving shareholders and were they generating enough wealth.

At that same time, the ability of pension plans to start to begin allocating capital forces people to say, “Well, wait a second, maybe we as shareholders, we want a different structure.” And in financial thinking, we have a set of ideas about why and how shareholders can diversify themselves. So, why should conglomerates be doing it for them? All of this, I think, gives the seed to, well, wait a second, maybe these things should be dismantled. And maybe we need to take power back from managers in a way that we had ceded during the past 30 to 40 years.

ADI IGNATIUS: Yeah, Lynn?

LYNN PAINE: Yeah, I’ll just jump in there.

ADI IGNATIUS: Please.

LYNN PAINE: Also adding to the story, a couple of other things, you know, we’re starting to see competition from Japan and Germany.

MIHIR DESAI: Right.

LYNN PAINE: And some disappointment with how U.S. companies are responding to that competition. And back in, I think it was 1971 or so when HBS professor Myles Mace published his very influential book, Directors: Myth and Reality. And what he uncovered was some very powerful managers and some very weak boards of directors, little more than rubber stamps for their managers. And then most of the managers were more focused, as Mihir has already pointed out, on building their empires, not serving their shareholders or any other stakeholder for that matter. So, things were pretty, pretty bad at the time.

You know, the other thing I’d add into the mix is, is that was also the era of the beginning of the corporate social responsibility movement.

MIHIR DESAI: Mm-hmm.

LYNN PAINE: And particularly, I don’t know if anybody remembers “Nader’s Raiders,” Ralph Nader, and Campaign GM. Where that was Ralph Nader and some Washington lawyers all trying to get GM to be more focused on auto safety, on pollution, on minority hiring. And I think there was just this sense that things were just kind of collapsing on all fronts. And just remember what the title of Milton Friedman’s article was, it was “The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.” So, I don’t know Milton Friedman. I don’t know his thought processes. But my sense is that he was very worried that all of these other demands coming from society were going to make this ownership and control problem even worse.

ADI IGNATIUS: Yeah, and you’re talking about Milton Friedman’s famous piece in the New York Times that really kind of moved this debate along. So, here we are. So, this is a very dynamic time in American business and global business. Carola, maybe I’ll hand it to you. Can you talk about, then, you know, where these, these ideas, sort of shareholder-first ideas, where they come from and how they take root?

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Well, the ideas were always there in some shape or form. You can open Harvard Business Review articles in the ’30s or in the ’50s that are trying to emphasize how, ultimately, the shareholders and the owners, and what they want is they want to see returns. But those are some voices here and there. What happens with Milton Friedman’s article in the New York Times, and then with Jensen/Meckling’s paper and their articles in a little bit later in the ’70s is that these are very prominent figures. And they really catch fire. They articulate the problems really well. They make the, the problem, crystal clear.

And given all of the context at the time that Mihir and Lynn were describing so well, this gives a clear metric that firms should be maximizing as an objective. So, what’s very interesting is that these ideas become very influential and take hold very, very quickly. So, if you read random articles in the New York Times or in the Wall Street Journal not that long after in the 1980s, for example, it’s not a discussion on whether shareholders’ value maximization should be the objective. It’s a fact. Shareholders’ value maximization is the objective.

MIHIR DESAI: Yeah, and I’d just like to add one more piece of context, because Carola and Lynn already laid out a lot of it. But I, I think it’s also important to remember that politically in the 1980s, there is a resurgence of kind of classical economics. And Friedman and others are arguing, at a time when people are disillusioned with what had been a little bit of a leftward shift in thinking, that we needed to return. And, of course, Reagan is the embodiment of that. So, I don’t think we can abstract away from this background political context of a rightward shift in U.S. politics, and, of course, in the UK as well.

ADI IGNATIUS: Mihir, do you want to talk a little bit more about what, you know, Jensen and his coauthor were trying to fix and what their arguments were exactly?

MIHIR DESAI: Mike Jensen, and his coauthors, and, in particular, in their really remarkable article the Eclipse of the Public Corporation in HBR, really, threw a broadside against managers and against that notion of managerial power. What he does is quite interesting, he basically says, “Public corporations are dead. They are no longer a meaningful way to advance welfare.”

And of course, it’s a very hyperbolic statement. But what he’s getting at is the rise of private equity, the rise of leveraged buyouts, and the ability to say, “Well, wait a second, maybe diffuse ownership isn’t required. Maybe it just won’t be like that anymore.” And it’ll be better, because of exactly the issue that Carola began us on, which is incentive alignment.

It all becomes about incentive alignment, which is we need managers and owners to be back on the same page. And the only way to accomplish that, in this view, is to pay managers with stock, because that creates the incentive alignment. That is really, from their perspective, the core issue in modern capitalism, which is the separation of ownership and control. And again, this comes at a time where rightward shifts in politics, and disappointments with the economic growth of the ’70s serves as very fertile ground for seeding these ideas.

ADI IGNATIUS: Lynn, do you remember when you first heard of this concept and sort of what you thought about this?

LYNN PAINE: Oh, I remember it very well. It was the early 1980s, and I was at a conference. And I was chatting with a graduate student who was very excited about the thesis he was writing. And of course, I asked him to tell me about it, and he said he’s writing a thesis on this hot new idea called agency theory. As I listened to it, I was actually not particularly impressed! Because everything he said was so at odds with what I had learned in law school.

So, you know, for example, he was telling me that managers were the agents of the shareholders. Well, you know, an agent is kind of an order taker, whereas a fiduciary is somebody who’s supposed to exercise independent judgment. And here, judgment on whose behalf? The student was telling me it was on behalf of shareholders. And I had learned that, no, you’re fiduciary for the corporation and the shareholders, not just the shareholders. So, I didn’t think this theory was gonna go anyplace, and (laughs)-

MIHIR DESAI: (laughs)

LYNN PAINE: But I guess I turned out to be wrong.

ADI IGNATIUS: So far.

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Can I, can I briefly jump in?

ADI IGNATIUS: Yes.

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Because the insight that comes out of these papers is really quite simple, but powerful. Which is to say, once we have hired managers, professional managers, on their own, they’re not going to run the form to maximize the firm’s value. Because they’re going to respond to their own personal incentives—unless shareholders are designing the incentives of managers so that they are aligned with whatever the objective is. And that’s important. Because it’s saying, “Well, the manager on its own that’s gonna make the day-to-day decisions, left to her own devices, will think about her own personal benefits or her own preferences. As Jensen and Meckling said very nicely, agency costs are as real as other costs. And they do not disappear depending on what we put as the objective in the maximization function.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, that’s interesting. And I, I mean, it’s a fascinating argument. And you know, Friedman’s argument that look, businesses should just worry about making money, and—that wasn’t totally callous, you know—that other things will be taken care of if they do that. And then, you know, Jensen and Meckling, who, you know, are trying to solve the agency problem.

But what’s interesting to me is, you know, Lynn as a young scholar had problems with it, and yet, it settles into orthodoxy. And for decades, it’s not only like accepted practice, but you talk to CEOs they say, “Hey, I have no choice. The law requires me to maximize shareholder value, or I am abdicating my, you know, legal fiduciary responsibility.” So, more than a fad, it is thought to be the only possible approach that CEOs can responsibly take. How did that happen? And Lynn maybe, maybe I’ll ask you to, to start?

LYNN PAINE: Well, I think the point you make about simplicity is really important. Because the, the fundamental idea that it all starts with is the notion that shareholders own the corporation, even my two-year-old grandson, he knows what he is.

ADI IGNATIUS: (laughs)

MIHIR DESAI: (laughs)

LYNN PAINE: And so, this is a very simple idea. And agency’s a very simple idea. They are the principles, and they delegate authority to their agents to then manage the corporation. But the very premise that shareholders own the corporation, at least from a legal point of view, is very dubious. Shareholders own their shares, but they don’t own the corporation in any traditional sense of ownership.

What I’m really saying is, as a shareholder, you’re not a proprietor of the corporation. You’re not responsible for its debts, its misdeeds. You’re not accountable for any injuries that it imposes on third parties. I mean, I can be a shareholder of say, Apple, but I don’t get the keys to the premises. And I can’t go in and pick up a phone for myself whenever I need one. So, you do own your shares, but it’s a very different concept of ownership from the traditional concept.

MIHIR DESAI: Mm.

LYNN PAINE: But that theory starts with that fundamental premise. We have to also remember in the 1970s and 1980s, institutional shareholding was really picking up—particularly pension funds and government retirement funds—and looking for returns, as Mihir was saying earlier. So, this theory found a ready audience, an audience that said, “Ah, this can help us,” and there was a lot in it for the institutional investors and the fund managers.

MIHIR DESAI: Yeah.

LYNN PAINE: I mean, a good example is CalPERS, which was one of the early companies to get involved in corporate governance issues and shareholder activism in the 1980s. If you go back and look at their materials, you can see that they were pretty directly influenced by this theory. Some of their materials say, “We are owners, we’ve been asleep at the wheel, we need to wake up to that and start asserting our rights.” And institutional investors became a very powerful lobbying force. So, this whole thing is not just about an idea that people globbed onto. There was a movement. There was politics. There was lots of influence. And there was lots of money to be made from this idea by certain groups, and those groups promoted this idea.

MIHIR DESAI: Yeah. Lynn, I just want to pick up on this rise of institutional investors, because I think it’s so important, right? It’s not just pension funds, but it’s an entire change in the way that Americans view savings and the way their retirements get funded. So, if you go back to the ’60s, the GM pension plan, for example, was managed by GM. And then beginning in the early 1970s, they delegated to the nascent private equity firms and nascent venture capital firms that grow up to basically serve to manage assets on their behalf.

So, now you have an industry—the investment management industry—being born, that is crystallizing the idea that, well, our interests need to be served. And then, of course, you have the defined contribution revolution, again, through the late 1970s and early 1980s, that says, “Well, wait a second, the way we do retirement savings should be different, which is it shouldn’t be through firms. We should have portable benefits.” That change makes individuals think of themselves as investors in a way that they never thought of themselves before.

And of course, we have the rise of the mutual fund industry, which again, just explodes in the 1980s and 1970s. And of course, this industry, to Lynn’s point, has every reason to also propagate that idea. Because private equity becomes a major asset class. Venture capital becomes a major asset class. And so, there are a lot of self-interested folks doing lots of things to propagate the idea as well.

ADI IGNATIUS: Carola, how did all this affect executive compensation?

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Well, it’s really a transformative effect on executive compensation. The idea that stock and stock options could be used to align incentives to some extent is not novel. Firms had been using stock and actually stock options before the Great Depression. But all through the ’50s, ’60s, ’70s, the use is relatively minimal.

So, what happens is, Jensen has another really influential paper. In this case, with Kevin Murphy in 1990. That basically says that executives are being paid as bureaucrats. And what they mean by that is that most of their pay is relatively fixed, independent of firm performance. They estimate, essentially, that CEOs get about $3 for each $1,000 in value that they create for their firms. And so, the claim is they get a fixed wage, they have no incentives to work hard or do right by the shareholders.

So, what we see happen through the 1990s is a rapid rise in the levels of CEO pay. But more importantly, a big shift from salaries, relatively fixed bonuses, short-term bonuses, to a very large fraction of the compensation coming through stock options and restricted stock. It’s also aided by a tax reform in 1993, that essentially makes a tax disadvantage for firms to pay executives in relatively fixed forms of pay that are not tied to the performance of firms.

CAROLA FRYDMAN: What we do really see is that the 1990s are the period of the most rapid rise in executive compensation amongst the largest firms, whether we’re looking at averages or medians. And it’s been a lot more stable since, actually. There hasn’t been quite such a sharp increase—some ups and downs, but not the same level of increase—since the early 2000s.

ADI IGNATIUS: So yeah, that 1990 article you mentioned was in HBR: “CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How.” Carola, I’m interested, to what extent has this idea of shareholder value maximization actually influenced corporate systems in countries besides the U.S.?

CAROLA FRYDMAN: I think it’s interesting, my perspective is that actually in the last 20, 30 years, we’ve seen a convergence on both sides. Surveys to managers in the early 1990s reflected stark differences in what the objective was across the world. Managers in the U.S., but also the UK or Canada, primarily responded that the one and only objective was shareholders’ value maximization.

Managers in Germany, Japan, for example, were a lot more likely to prioritize stakeholders’ value maximization. And that’s because historically, the governance of firms in Germany and Japan has been very different. There is labor representation mandated in the boards of German corporations.

But what we’ve seen over time is that the significance of shareholders’ value maximization has also influenced other countries. One case in which we see it very clearly is with executive compensation, where the use of equity-based pay was largely non-existent in other countries. And that has changed tremendously as they became aware of the extent to which it was used in the U.S.

ADI IGNATIUS: I mean, this is surely the, the beginning, I guess, of the, the debate over income disparity.

MIHIR DESAI: Yeah.

ADI IGNATIUS: I mean, Peter Drucker’s idea that, you know, the, top earner should not make more than 20 times what, you know, an average-salaried worker makes, obviously seems quaint after this explosion of executive compensation. Coming up after the break, we’re going explore the backlash to shareholder value maximization. Is there a better way? Stay with us.

Welcome back to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: shareholder value. I’m Adi Ignatius. So, the idea of shareholder maximization takes hold, it really was an era that lasted for a long time. Mihir, would you be willing to sort of then look at the positives and negatives of this 50 years that we really subscribe to this theory?

MIHIR DESAI: Sure. And I think, you know, my approach to this question is to perhaps quote Churchill.

LYNN PAINE: (laughs)

MIHIR DESAI: Which is, you know, it’s a terrible form of capitalism, but for all the others.

CAROLA FRYDMAN: (laughs)

MIHIR DESAI: You know, which is what Churchill said about democracy. Which is to say there are many problematic aspects to it. You alluded to one, a pretty dramatic rise in income inequality as the ratio of compensation at the top end of the distribution goes to several hundred of those at the bottom of the distribution. I think there was an obliviousness to the central disaster of our time, which is, of course the environmental disaster, and that could have been fostered by this exclusive focus on one metric.

Having said all that, I struggle with what people have been suggesting as alternatives. And you’ll remember Adi, and I’m sure it was in the pages of HBR, which is, “Well, the right way to do this is the Japanese way, you know, we need keiretsu’s, you know, that’s gonna be the solution.” Well, that hasn’t turned out terribly well. The German model turns out to be considerably more idiosyncratic than I think other many people would think of it as. For a while it was, “No, state capitalism as pioneered in China is gonna be the way to do this. That’s going to be the winner.” So, I think these other examples are complicated.

Now, there is concern about income inequality at the national level. But of course, these last three or four decades have seen a remarkable reduction in global income inequality. And I think that’s quite positive. And really remarkable technological accomplishments that have been pioneered by these high-powered incentives. Including in technology that we, you know, laud in venture capital. Which, of course, is predicated on this very idea of incentive alignment that Carola outlined.

So, I think there are many problems. But I don’t think we should, you know, sell short the idea of what it has accomplished for us. And, in particular, in comparison to what alternative models that were heralded during those last 50 years have not delivered.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, that seems fair, but we’re obviously in a moment now where a lot of people are dissatisfied with the shareholder first, the shareholder primacy model. Some of the biggest criticisms of maximizing shareholder value are well-known, but I think it’s worth ticking them off here.

So, I mean, here are a few: short-termism. You know, the sense that CEOs are leading companies to the benefit of the quarterly earnings report, rather than the long-term health of the company. With everything that implies layoffs, reductions in R&D spending, and so on.

Value transfer, as opposed to value creation. That hedge funds, for example, will buy shares, will gain an active role on a board, and then prompt moves to move earnings forward, and then they sell. They’re also not there for long-term growth. So these are some of the most common complaints. But Lynn, you know, what are some other negative and positive impacts that the practice of this idea has had?

LYNN PAINE: That era did bring in more discipline of a certain sort and running the firm or focus on efficiency and more accountability of a certain type. I mean, when I think about the boards that Myles Mace described back in the 1970s, this whole movement certainly woke up a lot of sleeping boards. and they became much more active. So, there were some, definitely some positives to talk about here.

But when you think about maximizing value for shareholders in the U.S. context, you’re really talking about maximizing value for the wealthiest Americans. 90{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550} of U.S. public company equities are held by the wealthiest 10{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550} of Americans. Most Americans get their income, their wealth, from their jobs, from their wages.

ADI IGNATIUS: Mm-hmm.

LYNN PAINE: And if we look at what’s happened to wages in the U.S., and Mihir made the point about global, which I think is also very important. But in the U.S., there’s been very stagnant wages for lower-wage workers and middle-wage workers. Shareholders have done wonderfully over this period. I do feel this problem of income inequality and the kind of divisive times that we live in—it’s going to be hard for us to rebuild the fabric of society unless we think of a better way to share the benefits of this wonderful system that we have.

ADI IGNATIUS: Lynn, how would you define stakeholder capitalism, and you know, where’s this push coming from?

LYNN PAINE: So, we’ve already referred to this as this idea that a company, a corporation should be run for the benefit of all of its stakeholders, and not just for shareholder returns. That’s kind of the core idea. And from a practical point of view, most companies define their core stakeholders as their core constituencies: their employees, their customers, their shareholders, their suppliers, their partners, communities, and the public at large. That’s sort of the set of stakeholders.

The word first appeared in the 1960s, but it was in the mid-1980s, when Professor Ed Freeman, who’s now a professor at the Darden School, wrote his book, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, that it really kind of put the idea on the map. It really came into the popular imagination over the last decade.

All this is really being driven by an appreciation and awareness of some of these large social and economic problems that we have and the huge environmental crisis that we have. And an understanding that if we just keep on with sort of business as usual—shareholder value maximization—it’s not going to help solve these problems. In fact, it’s probably going to make them worse.

And some of the proponents are—they’re not anti-capitalist—they are experienced business leaders. They are investors. And they’re young people too, looking for how are we going to cope with this world that we’re inheriting? There’s a lot to work out about it. I mean, I don’t think it’s nearly as well-grounded or as well-thought-through as shareholder value maximization.

ADI IGNATIUS: It lacks that simplicity, yeah.

LYNN PAINE: Yeah, it lacks a simplicity. But it also kind of lacks the whole theoretical foundation that’s there. And from a practitioner point of view, I think there’s a lot of confusion, actually, about what it means in practice.

ADI IGNATIUS: I guess one question I have is, whether the shift is real? You know, CEO incentives, I think still tend to be stock-based and, you know, aligned in the same way, as they always were. Active investors are still out there. Carola, the rhetoric has certainly changed. You can’t go to Davos and not talk about stakeholder capitalism, you’ll get booed out of the room. But in practice, are we seeing a change?

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Well, the age comment that Lynn made, I think partly what’s behind this is the younger generation of employees, consumers, and also investors have different preferences. They’re putting more emphasis on climate impact, for example, than the older generation had. And so, in part firms are responding to these concerns, because that’s going to be what’s best for shareholders too.

And in part, because that, as we said before, institutional investors have different preferences. And they express their preferences about environmental and various governance issues in a different way than they did in the past. So, my view [is that] executives are seeing they have to respond to it, because otherwise that’s going to be bad for their firms.

What the impact that’s going to have in practice, I think it’s a little bit early to tell.

MIHIR DESAI: Mm-hmm.

CAROLA FRYDMAN: And it has a, for me, a very big question mark. As Lynn said, shareholders’ value maximization is one very clear metric. It’s easy to quantify and understand. When we think about ESG, or corporate social responsibility, they’re not as easy to measure in a consistent way or we don’t know what the correct measure is. There are lots of different components. Not all of them matter equally. And also, when we think about the diversity of investors of firms, they don’t all have the same preferences.

MIHIR DESAI: Yeah.

CAROLA FRYDMAN: Even if executives are trying to maximize stakeholder value, what does that mean in practice? How do they elicit and weigh the different preferences of all of these stakeholders, and how does that translate into action? And the worry that I have is that it really in a way—that lack of clarity—opens up the room for the agency problem to resurface.

MIHIR DESAI: Mm-hmm. I think that’s super interesting Carola. And it’s real. I think it’s totally real, Adi. Which is compensation is now being linked to ESG metrics. People are thinking hard about it in important ways. I think it’s absolutely real.

My concern is that it’ll, per Carola’s comments, give rise to more agency problems. I mean, I’m reminded of the WeWork filing documents where Adam Neumann said he was going to be saving the world with his company, but was in fact, you know, lining his pockets.

And then the reason I’m really concerned, to go to Lynn’s comments, is that I think it’s a displacement of what are fundamentally political dissatisfactions and political ambitions that are better mediated in the political sphere than in the commercial sphere. You know, if we want to fix the world’s problems—which I do want to—you know, the vehicle for doing that is the political domain. Which may, by the way, include restricting companies from doing things. Somehow we’ve convinced ourselves that the right way to approach this problem—the global problems we face—is to give corporations more latitude to do the things that they think are right. And that seems kind of problematic, and maybe anti-democratic. So, I think it’s a totally real movement. It has enormous potential. But I think there are some real issues about it as well.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, it’s just… it’s a funny period, where we’re looking to companies, we’re looking to CEOs to solve social problems, for better or worse. But I’d love before we’re done to have each of you talk a little bit about, so where are we headed? I mean, I don’t want to say 100 years now, because that’s nonsense. But, you know, if the last 50 years was a sort of Milton Friedman-esque, Reagan-esque, whatever you want to call it, shareholder first, with all the positives and negatives that come from that. Where are we headed? What’s the phase that we’re entering now? Lynn do you want to–

LYNN PAINE: I just feel that we are in a period of experimentation right now. The old paradigm has broken down in various ways. And we don’t have a, you know, a turnkey new one all ready to put in place. And I’m actually kind of encouraged by all of these experiments. That’s kind of the natural process of working through when this old paradigm has broken down, and we’re looking for a new one.

I’m encouraged that some of the advocates and proponents of a shareholder-focused model are rethinking, what is shareholder value? We can find problems with all of these things. But I think it’s good that we’re having this conversation and that there are all of these competing ideas out there, and that we should be working on them.

So, I don’t have a crystal ball. I don’t know what it’s going to look like in 30 or 40 years. But honestly, I don’t think anybody on any side of the debate really wants to go back to the old days, when companies were dumping their pollution into the community water supply in the name of maximizing shareholder value.

ADI IGNATIUS: Mihir?

MIHIR DESAI: I certainly think that’s right. I agree with everything that Lynn said. In fact that we are in this very transitional period, and it’s very exciting, and it’s great to see people coming up with different ideas.

I would be cautious to discount the power of shareholder value maximization as an ongoing bedrock of what we do. In part because of its, I think, some genuine successes. I think it’s really about curbing the excesses of the shareholder value model more than it is about supplanting it with some different notion. Perhaps with legislation. Perhaps with a reinvigorated sense of what the state would do. I think that is the most fruitful way forward.

I don’t know exactly what will happen. But I would not discount that the bedrock will continue to be some form of what we have come to know as shareholder value maximization. But hopefully with more effective curbs on egregious behavior. Hopefully with a more powerful state to counter the force of corporations. I think that would be a good place to end up.

ADI IGNATIUS: And Carola?

CAROLA FRYDMAN: I completely agree with Mihir. What I don’t think is going to happen is, I think we understand the corporate form thankfully is not dead. And the reason for that is that yes, the separation of ownership and control has the agency problem. But we know about it. And we can try to figure out how to address it, not perfectly in some ways.

But the advantage again goes back to what Mihir said before, is the fact that we can diversify risk. And that means firms can take on bigger projects, riskier projects, innovate. And that’s a huge engine for growth.

Now, exactly what we maximize and how we address these problems, I think that’s where we see this constant evolution. With executive compensation, there has been a lot of back and forth. It’s a little bit of a pendulum that slowly moves towards progress. And I think that’s part of what we’re seeing now. It’s going back to take into account the preferences and values of other stakeholders.

But I don’t think that’s going to fully supplant the shareholders’ value as one of the key things that corporations are going to maximize. But it’s a very interesting moment, given what history has taught us. We don’t always get it right. And, in fact, we learn over time, and we try something. It doesn’t work perfectly, we try to fix it. We move one step at a time.

ADI IGNATIUS: I’ve been speaking with Lynn Paine and Mihir Desai of Harvard Business School and Carola Frydman of the Kellogg School of Management.

Next up in our special series 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World will be emotional intelligence. HBR executive editor Alison Beard will talk with three experts about how to identify and manage one’s own emotions, as well as the emotions of others. That is next Thursday right here in the HBR IdeaCast feed after our regular Tuesday episode.

This episode was produced by Curt Nickisch. We get technical help from Rob Eckhardt. Our audio product manager is Ian Fox, and Hannah Bates is our audio production assistant. Special thanks to Maureen Hoch for her help on this project.

Thank you for listening to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World, a special series of the HBR IdeaCast. I’m Adi Ignatius.

4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Scientific Management

4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Scientific Management

CURT NICKISCH: Welcome to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World, a special series of the HBR IdeaCast. In 1878, a machinist at a Pennsylvania steelworks noticed that his crew was not producing nearly as much as he thought they could. Frederick Winslow Taylor began systematic studies to determine exactly how much work should be done. With stopwatches and later stop-motion film, Taylor analyzed the efficiency of workers, tweaking everything down to how they moved their arms, the size of their shovels, and how long they could take a breather. It helped factory owners make more pumps, steel, and ball bearings with lower labor costs. It was the birth of a management theory… called scientific management or Taylorism. And Taylor became the face of it, a world-renown management consultant before there were any. Critics said his drive for industrial efficiency depleted workers physically and emotionally. Congress held hearings on it. Still, scientific management was the dominant management theory 100 years ago in October of 1922, when Harvard Business Review was founded. It spread around the world, fueled the rise of big business, and helped decide World War II. And today it is baked into workplaces from call centers to restaurant kitchens, gig worker algorithms, and offices. Though few of us would recognize it and few employers would admit to it. In this special series from HBR IdeaCast, we’re exploring 4 Business Ideas that Changed the World. Each week, we talk to scholars and experts on the most influential ideas of HBR’s first 100 years, such as disruptive innovation, shareholder value, and emotional intelligence. This week: “Scientific Management.” With me to discuss it are Nancy Koehn, historian at Harvard Business School. Michela Giorcelli, an economic historian at UCLA. And Louis Hyman, a work and labor historian at Cornell University. I’m Curt Nickisch, a senior editor at Harvard Business Review and your host for this episode. Nancy, let’s start with you. How were workers managed at the time that Taylor joined the workforce in 1878?

NANCY KOEHN: That’s a great question. And the answer is all over the map. That is, how workers were managed and what their experience of working was in 1878, varied enormously, by industry, by place, by tradition, which still had a very big role to play in how workers and management came together to produce a good or a service. Although it was, by far in a way, about goods in the late 19th century in America. So, you had people like, in the early years of the steel business, an industry that Taylor will get into. Trying to figure out how, as they learned that making more steel makes the price of each unit of steel go down. In other words, they stumble into economies of scale. And they’re struggling to figure out, well, what does that mean for how we put men, mostly men in the steel business, together with capital? You have these different evolving, often chaotic arrangements. So, when we think of, you know, high-efficiency factory production today, we, we don’t have any, any inkling into what it was like in the late 19th century, to be in a factory because it was much, much more learning by doing, and much more disorganized than when we think of, say, semiconductor production today.

CURT NICKISCH: Louis, at the time, what was the understanding of being productive, of productivity?

LOUIS HYMAN: Well, I’m just going to echo Nancy here, that we think of productivity today as, how much stuff could I make? How efficient am I? Well, these ideas are not ahistorical. They’re grounded in a particular set of values that comes out of the transition from working in a shop of an apprentice system to a world where you are working in a factory for a boss. That is the emergence of wage work. And it’s not just technology that changes, which we’re all very familiar with, but social relationships that we go from a place where the apprentice and the master, in a sense, the master of a craft like a cobbler work side by side to produce a few high-quality shoes every day, to a world where a wage worker wants to produce as many shoes, as possible of an uncertain quality. So, workers themselves, as they are apprentice and masters imagine that, why shouldn’t I drink beer and sing songs while I make my shoes? This is quite different than the world of a factory, where Taylor exists.

CURT NICKISCH: Michela, can you develop that further? It’s, it’s hard to imagine for us today, right, a time when productivity wasn’t even an economic principle.

MICHELA GIORCELLI: It definitely is, but as Louis just pointed out, despite its centrality in the modern debate, productivity is a fairly recent concept. Businesses were very small. They would average three to four workers. It was very easy for the owner to coordinate their task, to monitor their jobs. And very easy, owners and employees that were working side by side to produce output. The situation traumatically changed with the industrial revolution because the dynamic of the workplace was completely changed. Let’s think, for instance, the company is building railroads and telegraphs. At that point, it became extremely important to assign the best task workers, in order to coordinate production across different units and in different parts of the country. As such, the development of the concept of productivity is strongly related to the development of the concept of management. Intended as a bundle of practices, that coordinate the tasks and the work of the employees, in order to reach the optimum productivity.

CURT NICKISCH: So, this is the business world that Taylor came into. Nancy, who was Frederick Winslow Taylor? And what did he experience in his first job?

NANCY KOEHN: So, Frederick Winslow Taylor was the son of Quakers. His father was a successful lawyer, who actually had made enough money, um, that he could live a kind of life of leisure. And his mother, a woman named Emily Annette Taylor, a direct descendant of Mayflower voyagers, way back in the 17th century. She was also an ardent abolitionist and suffragette. So, he comes from this, again, patrician family with, you know, a very active mother. And you know, this is a young man who had nightmares, as a boy, invents a machine, a set of harnesses to wake him up when he starts to turn so he doesn’t have nightmares.

CURT NICKISCH: Hmm.

NANCY KOEHN: This is a young man who before he goes to a party, makes a list of all the attractive girls and the unattractive girls, and resolves to spend equal time with both. This is a young man when he plays croquet says, “Oh, here’s the geometry of this particular croquet field. And here are the kind of vectors, I wanna be able to hit, to win the game.” I mean, he’s, he’s interested in control, which is an important aspect of scientific management. He passes the Harvard admissions exams with some m- room to spare, but he has these terrible headaches and real eye problems. And decides not to enroll in college. And instead, he takes a job as a worker, he later will kinda rise to management, in Philadelphia, in what today we call a machine tool company. It’s called Enterprise Hydraulics, and it makes pumps. And, and he, he begins to think then, about how do you increase efficiency in labor’s relationship to management, and in labor’s relationship to the machines or the tools they use, as part of their role in increasing productivity.

CURT NICKISCH: What did he see there, at work? And, you know, what did he end up doing about the problems that he solved?

NANCY KOEHN: Well, he sees that, that workers are in his eyes, not working as hard, as they can. And he, he becomes interested in how do I kinda tease out that problem, right, unpack it and what do we do about it. Most workers, including the apprentices that Louis was talking about, are paid based on what they make, or, or how much they make. So, in that kind of system, workers are trying to, you know, do more. But ultimately, in almost every kind of piece rate or pay from what today, an economist like Michela would call pay for workers marginal product, in that setting, almost all managers said, “Well, after a certain point, you’re not gonna get any more.” So, there’s, if you will, a kind of pay ceiling. Well, workers figured that out real quick and decide, Well, I’m only gonna work as hard as I need to work in order to make the maximum that my boss will pay me. And that then, presents a really interesting problem for Frederick Taylor which is, how do I get workers to work more? So, that’s part of the problem. Workers aren’t working as hard, as they can. And they’re not necessarily working in a standardized way. And that was true in the way that you heard Louis speaks so eloquently about, shops and apprenticeships and small-scale manufacturing. And even, remember, in America, a lot of America is still moving from the farm to the factory. So, you have people that never worked indoors before, in a sense. Adding to, if you will, the uncertainty and the caprice and the variation that Frederick Taylor sees. And that makes him anxious and determined to clean things up.

CURT NICKISCH: So, he starts conducting experiments to better control what workers are doing. Is that right?

NANCY KOEHN: That’s exactly what he starts doing, right? And he comes up with all kinds of what today, we’d call, well, we might call them standard operating practice. I was just gonna say, use the word, rules, right? Ways of doing things, um, in very specific ways of doing things. Every single job can be reduced to a series, maybe a very small number of tasks, done one right way. One right way. And he’s trying to reduce, right, the amount, if you will, the standard deviation in what each worker does in a very specific way along a very specific, what today we would call, production function.

CURT NICKISCH: What experiments is he running? What is he making workers do?

NANCY KOEHN: So, one of the things he’s doing, for example, in Midvale, where he’ll spend some real length of time. So, the famous one is a Dutchman, an immigrant laborer who, handpicked by Frederick Taylor, what he called a first-class man. And he does a series of studies about how Schmidt, which is a name he gives him in his, in his writings, moves pig iron, right. It’s not moving on a conveyor belt, he’s moving pig iron.

NANCY KOEHN: And, and by showing Schmidt how to do this, right, you, you bend down this way. You pick it up here. You take this many steps over, across the whatever, the factory floor to move it over here. And then, you rest at certain intervals. And you rest for exactly whatever, 90 seconds. By showing him exactly how to do that, according to Frederick Taylor, he increases Schmidt’s output by almost, I think it’s three and a half fold. It’s like, from 12 tons a day to something like, 47 tons of pig iron a day, that he’s moving. And how he literally dissects that all the way down to how many steps he takes, and how many times he does it before he rests for how many seconds. That is the essence of what he’s doing, for, for a myriad, scores and scores of component parts of a job.

LOUIS HYMAN: What I think an important part of what Nancy is talking about, it’s not just the imagination of work, but the imagination of the worker. What’s crucial here, is that his idea of Schmidt is an idea, and it appeals to the readers of his theory. So, he describes him, as you know a first-rate man in terms of his ability, very strong, very industrious. But also quote, “Mentally sluggish.”

NANCY KOEHN: Right.

LOUIS HYMAN: That this is someone who is not really able to solve problems for himself. Taylor writes about him, that he is so stupid that the word percentage has no meaning for him. So, it’s not simply possible to give him incentives through piece rates to make him work harder. He has to be guided by the hand of a manager.

CURT NICKISCH: Michela, Taylor’s coming up with this system then, to make workers do things a certain way. And he leaves Midvale Ironworks in 1890, and spends the next years consulting with various companies, Bethlehem Steel one of them, to help them increase productivity. He eventually even refashions himself as a management consultant – perhaps the first one ever, right?

MICHELA GIORCELLI: Yes, exactly. So, Taylor developed himself a new profession and called himself a consulting engineer in management. And in this role, Taylor ended up serving a long list of prominent firms in many industries, cities, and towns. And his main goal, when he was working with these different companies in different roles, was to develop the core ideas of the, scientific management like the idea of scientific selection of workers. And the importance of differential pay incentives, in order to motivate the workers to increase productivity. So, the fact that he spent many years consulting around the country actually helped him to put together the principles of scientific management that will become the title of his most famous book published in 1911.

CURT NICKISCH: Mm-hmm. Louis, how did workers feel about Taylor’s methods?

LOUIS HYMAN: Not good, Curt, not good. It was an incredibly exhausting way to work with somebody else telling you what to do all day, how to move your body.

CURT NICKISCH: Having somebody stand there with a stopwatch.

LOUIS HYMAN: No, you don’t feel like a man. You feel like a dog, right? You are being inspected constantly. And it is very hard to feel good about what you do, and you’re listening to his watch rather than your body over when you’re tired. And maybe your wages go up, maybe they go up 50{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550} and your productivity goes up 250{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550}. But ultimately, you don’t care because it’s not just about that one day of lugging pig iron, this is your whole life.

CURT NICKISCH: Hmm. Nancy, how did factory managers and owners that Taylor worked with, feel about him and his results?

NANCY KOEHN: So, the answer is very much mixed in terms of how managers and firm owners reacted to Taylor. There was a personal piece, which was he was, I think autocratic and very, very convinced. I mean, there’s something very naively utopian about Frederick Taylor. He thought was gonna build a world in which there was so much surplus created by all this increased labor productivity, that there would be no reason to fight about the surplus. He, he felt this was gonna be such a benefit to everyone concerned, that he could never understand why not only workers, but firm owners and managers who didn’t always welcome his, you know, it was either my way or the highway with Frederick Taylor, or Fred Taylor.

NANCY KOEHN: And I think both, in terms of his attitude and in terms of his didactic sense of, this is the way we’ll do it, he confused and he angered a variety of different kinds of managers. Particularly foremen, but also firm owners. He really was certain that there was one right way, and it was his way.

CURT NICKISCH: Mm-hmm. So, somehow, despite all this resistance, both from workers and some of the people who employed him, this method ends up becoming a movement. Michela, when did scientific management start attracting followers, outside just the, you know, word of mouth work that Taylor was getting here and there, at different companies?

MICHELA GIORCELLI: The first, the large-scale diffusion, up in 1903, when Taylor presented the first paper at the American Society of Mechanical Engineers annual conference. In the following years, this was between 1904 and 1912. Taylor devoted his time and his money to promote and diffuse the principle of scientific management. He traveled a lot around the country, giving lectures in university, talking at professional societies. And in this way, the ideas of Taylorism start spreading in the US. However, the turning point happened in 1910, when there was an Interstate Commerce Commission hearing and one of the attorneys argues that the U.S. railroads could have saved up to $1 million a day, if they introduced the scientific management principle. That hearing was extremely popular at the time, widespread coverage in the newspapers. Taylor’s scientific management ideas were on every lip. And the idea of efficiency, in a way – the productivity drive that is one of the core characteristics of the U.S. business model in the 20th century – starts becoming a national idea.

CURT NICKISCH: Nancy, right around this same time, workers go on strike at an arsenal, just outside Boston, to protest Taylor’s methods. Fun fact, Harvard Business Review was actually headquartered there at the Arsenal. I interviewed there, when I got this job. What happened at that strike?

NANCY KOEHN: So, Taylor sent one of his disciples to institute basically, time motions studies. And he shows up with a stopwatch. And he starts timing different workers doing different things. Clicking the stopwatch, and you know, I’m sure he’s got a clipboard and he’s writing things down. One worker says, “I won’t let you time me.” And management immediately fires him because management is interested in what Taylor’s work can bring to productivity at the arsenal. So, the worker is fired on the spot. And then, all the other workers just walk off the job and strike. And so, it’s a very good example of the assumption that there’s one right way, that only a certain small group of people called managers and scientific management experts – today we might call them consultants – that only small group of elite folks have that one right way. And that they have the power to put that one right way in place, regardless of the experience it offers for workers. And again, you think about the suddenness of this transition for many, many workers between 1880 and 1920, coming literally in many cases, off a vessel from Europe or some other part of the world as immigrants, and moving into factories. And the abruptness, right, and the, the massive discrepancy in power, the idea that what you know and what you’ve learned on a job isn’t worth anything if there’s only one way to do it. And the only people that can tell you that are the small group of high priests in industrial capitalism.

CURT NICKISCH: The strike got so much attention Congress investigated it.

NANCY KOEHN: Right. Congress investigates another moment for Taylorism, to take the spotlight on some kind of national stage. And on Capitol Hill, it wasn’t greeted with, you know, unconditional approval. Quite the opposite piece here, that was very, very important. A Congressman named William Wilson who is the chair of the committee that’s investigating Taylor, is worried about all the things we’ve been talking about here. Is it all about, just increasing speed? So, lots of folks on Capitol Hill, like Wilson, were concerned and so were labor leaders, about the skills that Louis was talking about, the lots of workers develop on the job in lots of different kinds of businesses and industries and production processes. What happens to that if we’re breaking down every single task into these tiny component parts and basically saying, there’s no room for any kind of discretion or experience or innovation to happen on the part of working men and women?

CURT NICKISCH: Louis, Nancy mentioned labor leaders there. How did the larger labor movement figure into this backlash?

LOUIS HYMAN: Well, I think they figured into it in the way that Nancy was talking about, as not just the question of making more widgets, moving more pig iron. But the larger political meaning of it for a democratic citizenry. Now, a long question throughout the 19th century was, how can wage work exist in a democracy? In a sense that, how can you obey for eight, 10, 12 hours a day, and then, expect to be free the rest of your time? How is it possible for someone who is so broken and dominated to then, exercise political freedom? And this is exactly what the president of the American Federation of Labor, Sam Gompers, tells congress. He says, “I grant you that if this Taylor system is put into operation, as we see it and, as we understand it, it will mean great production in goods and things. But in so far, as man is concerned, it means destruction.” And that is the question of Taylorism. Of course, you can make more stuff, but what is the cost? What is the cost in democracy? What is the cost in the long-term health of those workers? Gompers tells congress that Taylorism was the antithesis of industrial education. Because what Gompers was all about, was the idea that workers could be educated to be more productive. Why did they need those managers coming in, in with their stopwatches? Why couldn’t they themselves begin to figure out better production processes? And so, in some ways, this anticipates the insights at Toyota later in the 20th century. This kind of bottom-up worker knowledge of… obviously Gompers doesn’t call it Toyotaism. But the fundamental question for Gompers is, what are humans for? What is the range of human capacities? What is it the worth of the person, if they’re expected to become like a machine? And so, for Gompers then, productivity is not a neutral idea.

NANCY KOEHN: Yeah.

LOUIS HYMAN: But essentially about the power between workers and owners in that exact moment, but also in the future of America. For whom do the benefits of productivity flow? Does it go to the owners of capital? Does it go to the workers themselves? And I think that is the great debate, you know. Maybe I do get paid enough that I get an extra beer in the weekend. But what does that mean, if I’m so exhausted, so worn out, so, so broken, by this kind of work, that I don’t even want to leave my house on the weekend?

CURT NICKISCH: Michela, what was the upside of that congressional hearing? Did it stunt the spread of scientific management? Or was this one of those, any publicity is good publicity, sort of things?

MICHELA GIORCELLI: It was definitely one of, any publicity is good publicity. In the sense that, on paper, the committee report stated that neither the Taylor system or other management systems should impose on the workers against their will. And also, that any system of shop management, that should be the outcome of a mutual consensus between the workers and the managers. However, the committee declined to make any recommendation for this legislation. And so, and Taylor was very lucky to have the Congress come up with a very mild report. And Taylorism could continue to be spread and to be adopted, not only in the U.S., but also worldwide in the years to come.

CURT NICKISCH: Coming up after the break, we’re going to follow that spread, and discover how Taylorism got baked into our modern life and work. One hundred years later, have the human and social costs of increased productivity been resolved? Stay with us.

CURT NICKISCH: Welcome back to 4 Big Ideas That Changed the World: Scientific Management. I’m Curt Nickisch. Nancy, Taylor died in 1915, really kind of at the height of scientific management as an overt practice. This is a time when business schools were cropping up around the United States. Harvard Business Review was founded in 1922. The practice of management is taking shape and scientific management has pole position there. What effect did it have on the U.S. economy in the 20th century?

NANCY KOEHN: The British management scholar Lyndall Urwick observed that America owes to Taylor a large of incalculable proportion of the immense productivity and high standard of living that began to take hold, as the 19th century became the 20th century. I’m very skeptical of that. Scientific management took hold with, you know, corresponding larger effects in certain industries and not in, in others. You know, Taylorism didn’t really affect retailing. It really didn’t, you know, affect other industries, where labor was a very, very important piece of the story, in terms of the contribution of labor. DuPont Chemical, a huge – or Procter & Gamble, you know, a huge consumer products company, it’s not clear that Taylorism had a big effect in that company, say between the years of 1890 and 1950. It’s just, Taylorism took hold in places where labor’s contribution could be, you know, sliced into these tiny slices. Taylor played a big role there. That’s a big idea that mattered, right? But in terms of actually hiking up productivity, industry by industry, and the leading industries that created the 20th-century American economy, I think we’re on more shaky ground. Let me say one other thing, though, that’s really important to the, the power of the idea of scientific management, you know. Peter Drucker, a well-known management consultant, writer, thoughtful commentator on the evolution of business and management. Once said that Taylor was so important, he displaced [Karl] Marx in the pantheon of critical thinkers in the modern age. He included Darwin, Freud, and Marx. And he said, nope. Make way for Fred Taylor. Karl Marx goes out. I disagree with that completely, right? Karl Marx, right, understood that if Frederick Taylor would come along, commoditize labor, diminishes human creative, innovative potential, and squeeze it into a piece of a machine, and that’s what scientific management did in so many ways, subtly and less subtly. It really moved Marx’s prediction for the role of labor in industrial capitalism ahead, by leaps and bounds. He codified Marx by saying, “Labor is a commodity. We can get it to do exactly what we want. We want first-class pieces of commodity like Schmidt, and we’re gonna tell them exactly how to do things down to the second. Now, you contrast that with other kinds of productive processes, both in the Toyota system, Japanese capitalism, or German capitalism, or the beginnings of the information revolution in Silicon Valley, and the situation is completely different. And in all those, in all those instances, you have massive game-changing increases in productivity.

CURT NICKISCH: Sticking with the communists here, Louis, one surprising fan of Taylor’s ideas was the revolutionary Vladimir Lenin. Can you tell us more about that?

LOUIS HYMAN: Sure. Initially, Lenin was very skeptical of scientific management, following other kinds of labor critics that it was just a way to sweat more labor. That is to put people in sweat shots to increase their productivity, but not really pay them for the full value of that increased productivity. But he changes his mind. So, in 1917, he releases his book, The State and Revolution, which, if you’re the kind of person who is romantic about Marx, this book will not make you romantic about Lenin. So, if Marx imagines a future where we work a few hours a day, we fish a little, we do philosophy, in some sense, this is, imagining us all, as capitalists living off the prosperity. Well, this is not Lenin’s vision at all. In Lenin’s vision, he’s very much in line with Taylor’s thinking. Only, instead of management, there is the state. Lenin suggests that every worker should have six hours of physical work daily. And then, four hours of working for the state. So, a total of 10 hours. And this is a very different conception from Marx. And certainly, a different conception of what labor leaders like Gompers, want to see the future as. But it speaks to the underlying brutality and antihumanism in certain ways of Taylorism, and, of course, Leninism.

CURT NICKISCH: Well, he thought it worked, right? And he wanted to implement it, so that the Soviet Union would be competitive. Michela, we just heard about Lenin there, but how did Taylor’s idea spread outside the US?

MICHELA GIORCELLI: Taylor’s idea had two key characteristics to spread outside the US. The first one is that they were very adaptable, meaning that they were not specific to give them, from size, or a given sector. And this goes back to what we discussed before – the fact that Taylor has developed his, his ideas after widespread consulting in different industries, in different firms across the US. And the second key characteristic is that Taylor’s ideas were complemented by firm-specific practices. For instance, Taylorism was very well accepted in Japan. But the interpretation of the productivity drive in Japan was a little bit different relative to the US. The idea of increasing productivity in Japan was mostly related to the management of waste, and reducing waste, as much, as possible. And in a way, these were the first steps of lean production and the lean management system that would become predominant in Japan in the late ’60s and in the ’70s. Taylorism also spread in Europe. It ended up being adopted in many countries, including Britain and France, were the two European countries more active in the adoption of Taylorism.

CURT NICKISCH: So, was the industrial efficiency of the U.S. in World War II, did that strengthen this notion of exporting scientific management?

MICHELA GIORCELLI: Yes, absolutely. In the early ’40s, the technical and scientific knowledge of some European countries like Germany and the U.S. was very comparable. However, what was key for the U.S. to winning the war, was being able to produce at much higher speed than all the other European countries. And indeed, the U.S. invested a lot in the program for diffusion of managerial knowledge and scientific management. One of the most famous programs sponsored by the U.S. between 1940 and 1945, was managerial consulting to large U.S. companies involved in work production. After World War II, the U.S. sponsored, um, many programs to diffuse managerial technology. World War II definitely helped to create the so-called U.S. way of doing business. That was exported to Europe and Japan, in the aftermath of World War II.

CURT NICKISCH: Okay. Louis, as we move forward in the 20th century, the economy moves away from the factory and the shop floor. More service sector, more professional services. Did scientific management make that transition too?

LOUIS HYMAN: Absolutely. It has a huge shadow, a long shadow over how we think about the workplace. And this urge to quantify workers, to quantify time, existed as much, in the typing pools of words per minute, as it did in moving tons of pig iron. The movements and machines of fry cooks, as much, as textile workers. And now, of course, in the gig economy, or on bikes and cars, or on computers, where workers are constantly surveilled, treated like a commodity, watched by algorithms that are very much the descendants of Taylor’s stopwatch. And so, Taylor is everywhere. And it’s built into a kind of visceral sense of how to manage. You don’t really get an alternative in America to Taylorism until Douglas McGregor developed his famous Theory X and Theory Y. And Theory X is basically Taylor. And Theory Y is Gompers, that, that workers actually like being engaged with their work. They actually learn to take pride in their work. They respond to incentives. They can actually calculate percentages. But part of the reason why this Theory Y is possible to imagine by the 1960s, is that on the one hand, you have several generations of mass education, both in grade school and in high school. But also, the cutoff of immigrants. So, this is exactly the moment when the number of people who are born outside the U.S. is at its, its lowest point ever. So, it’s very easy to imagine other Americans like yourself, if you are a manager. And so, we see this story of who is like us and who is different than us, again, play out in this possibility of a new way to think about management. But even in those theories that are beginning to be developed in the 1960s, there is a sense that productivity remains everything.

CURT NICKISCH: Yeah. Nancy, Louis was talking there about scientific management kind of baked into contemporary offices and, and workplaces. Are we scientifically managed?

NANCY KOEHN: One of the really interesting aspects, just to get and to feed on the question what Louis just said, is how scientific management in the last 40 years has come to retailing, has come to call centers, has come to Amazon warehouses, has come to restaurants. As scientific management, as the economy has shifted, has increased its reach. Um, you see that both, in the recent unionization drives at Amazon, which have then, right, been undergirded by particular workers’ experiences, including h-

CURT NICKISCH: Right, how many times can you use the restroom?

LOUIS HYMAN: Absolutely.

NANCY KOEHN: And how much time has to elapse before you go back to the restroom, right? And how many boxes are you supposed to pack? We see it there. We see it in call centers, where if you scratch the surface of most call centers, right, which regardless of where they’re physically located, you will find people with headsets managed down to the minute. Not only in terms of bathroom breaks, but how many calls they have to handle per 15 minutes interval. It’s extraordinary. Call centers are the new, you know, Midvale Steel. So, I think that yes, I think that we, we are scientifically managed in, in many, many different kinds of work. Not all occupations are scientifically managed, but many, many of them were that weren’t, say, 60 years ago. And that speaks not only to its ability to adapt and evolve to new industries and new kinds of economic activity. It also speaks again to the huge hegemony that scientific management has had on the question of, how should workers and management do what they do together. The idea that, you know, kind of leaves us all in the dust, is Frederick Taylor’s scientific management. And that’s today, right, and it was true in 1910. And to me, that’s just so astounding. Why this answer? Why this right way? ‘Cause there isn’t one right way, and the history of capitalism shows us that. Even the history of Silicon Valley shows us that. But still, it’s scientific management that has left all kinds of other ideas, at least in America, in the dust.

CURT NICKISCH: Yeah, Michela. How is scientific management regarded today? If I use that term with people, a lot of people don’t even know it.

MICHELA GIORCELLI: Yes. Scientific management idea doesn’t have a very good perception today. In the sense that scientific management is seen as the program that denigrates the workers’ activity in order to increase productivity. But indeed, almost all the firms all over the world, adopt the scientific management principle. In the sense that, all the production is organized today, not only in the industry but also in services, is strongly shaped by the idea of productivity. And this is also testified by the increasing importance of managers, the rise of managers’ compensation that are considered key inputs for a firm, success. So, definitely the legacy of Taylor, even if maybe not properly acknowledged, is present in all the type of businesses.

CURT NICKISCH: Louis, how much do we owe our understanding of being productive and efficient and even, feeling productive or, you know, hating waste to Taylor?

LOUIS HYMAN: Well, Curt, it’s interesting. I think that the way we think about productivity is rooted in Taylor. But it’s also Taylor that roots us in a very particular conception of work. That on the one hand, there is a worker who is valuable, who is creative. This is the manager, as worker, right? This is the Silicon Valley programmer who is still lauded today. On the other hand, there is the worker who is not creative, and in sense then, not valuable. This is the person we should treat like a machine. When we look at the history of Silicon Valley, we often see the history of these technologists and coders, these creatives who play ping pong, whatever, who sit around in Bahama shorts, just not really doing anything, but then, having a great thought. But behind that-

CURT NICKISCH: And they’re drinking beer on the job, just like they did in Taylor’s time.

LOUIS HYMAN: Exactly. They did, right? But behind that is a whole world of production that gets written out of the history, you know. In the 1970s and ’80s, we hear the story of Steve Jobs and the Woz and Apple. But we hear less about the hundreds of thousands of people who actually worked in assembly plants in Silicon Valley.

NANCY KOEHN: Or China.

LOUIS HYMAN: And oftentimes, when these factories were talked about, they were talked about as robots building robots. But every time somebody said “robot,” if you actually looked at the actual people who worked there, how things were actually made in these lean production sites, it was actually women. Usually, women of color, who are usually immigrants. And so, we still have this imagination of some work being valuable, and some people being valuable. And they sort of, reinforce one another. What is the meaning of this today? Well, we are still thinking of productivity as something very bifurcated between those who, we don’t need them to be productive. They are 10X programmers. They are creative entrepreneurs. They can do amazing things in a few minutes, as long, as we give them time to think. And then, we imagine people who can’t think. People who aren’t deserving of time, people who aren’t deserving of that kind of creative human potential. For me, that is the moral meaning of productivity. This question of, who we value and what do we value?

CURT NICKISCH: Hmm. So, I want to ask each of you where scientific management leaves us, you know, today, in this world of work? What kind of future are we pointed to, now? And, I’ll go around the horn, but Nancy, maybe we could start with you.

NANCY KOEHN: So, I just want to pick up some threads, that there’s a runoff of one’s humanity in scientific management. A runoff of, you know, a giant sucking sound that says, some people, just to echo Louis, are, are more important than others. Some people make bigger contributions than others. Some work is more valued than others. And therefore, some people are more valued than others. That’s simply not, it’s just not, those are not very good eye beams to go into a century now, increasingly dominated by a- automation, artificial intelligence, and a very kind of unabashed and not terribly thoughtful embrace of all things technological. The storyline here, is not pulling from, in all kinds of directions. Not just morally, and not just in terms of political, social economic equality. And the massively destructive effects of the huge ramp-ups in inequality wealth and income we’ve seen over the last 50 years around the world. But this, even though, even holding those away. The storyline here, doesn’t look like it ends terribly well. And I think that piece, right, which Gompers, Gompers was talking about, you know, and, and so were other labor leaders in the, all throughout the first three of four decades of the 20th century. In which, a few politicians today, are talking about, that’s a very, it’s a very important nugget for all of us to chew on.

CURT NICKISCH: Michela?

MICHELA GIORCELLI: I will take a more economic perspective, here. And I see that the legacy of Taylorism has a lot to do with productivity. The idea of increasing productivity will remain with us also, in the future. It may, however, change. There are recent studies, for instance, focusing on the productivity of working from home. Or how technology allows us to work together. And we saw that during the pandemic, it allows us to increase productivity even without being physically in the same place. So, I think that the productivity is still there, help manage workers is still there. But the way in which it’s happening is changing, moving from the factory perspective, workplace perspective, to more of the work per se, no matter where it is performed.

CURT NICKISCH: Louis?

LOUIS HYMAN: Yeah. I think that this question of, what is the meaning of Taylor and productivity in the digital age, as Nancy and Michela were just saying, is the essential one. So, the question remains, as it did a century ago, who benefits from increased productivity? And in the digital era, there is again, the promise of machines continuing to liberate us from drudgery. To enable us, to become more fully human in our work. And this is important because we have a lot of challenges in the 21st century. And there’s so much talent in the world that right now, is sitting behind a cash register, making change, or more, just wrestling, hauling water back from a stream to her house. And so, we need technology to liberate us from these. And we don’t need it for workplace surveillance. So, I think the question about productivity is less about technology than the social imagination. How do we bring ourselves into this conversation about increasing our productivity, so that we can turn over that drudgery to our machines, to our computers, so that we can focus on human potential, human relationships, and human work?

CURT NICKISCH: That’s Nancy Koehn at Harvard Business School, Michela Giorcelli at UCLA, and Louis Hyman at Cornell. Next time in 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: disruptive innovation. HBR editor Amy Bernstein will talk to three experts about how our understanding has evolved of how new entrants succeed in the marketplace – and how to hack it in your favor. That’s next Thursday right here, in the HBR IdeaCast feed after our regular Tuesday episode. This episode was produced by Anne Saini. We get technical help from Rob Eckhardt. Our audio product manager is Ian Fox, and Hannah Bates is our audio production assistant. Special thanks to Maureen Hoch. Thanks for listening to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World, a special series of the HBR IdeaCast. I’m Curt Nickisch.

 

4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Disruptive Innovation

4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Disruptive Innovation

AMY BERNSTEIN: Welcome to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World, a special series of the HBR IdeaCast. In the 1980s, Clayton Christensen was in his 30s, the business guy at a startup. The company was making ceramics out of advanced materials, and it was able to take over the market niche from DuPont and Alcoa. That experience left Christensen puzzled. How could a small company with few resources beat rich incumbents? The question led to his theory of disruptive innovation, introduced in the pages of Harvard Business Review in 1995, and popularized two years later in The Innovator’s Dilemma.

The idea has inspired a generation of entrepreneurs. It’s reshaped R&D strategies at countless established firms, seeking to disrupt themselves before somebody else does. It’s changed how investors place billions of dollars and how governments spend billions more, aiming to kickstart new industries and spark economic growth. But the idea has taken on a meaning well beyond what Christensen actually described. Think about how easily we use the word disruption to explain any sort of innovation, business success, or industry shakeup.

It’s also drawn fire. Some critics argue the theory lacks evidence. Others say it glosses over the social costs of bankrupted companies, and debate continues over the best way to put the idea to work. On this special series, we’re exploring 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World. Each week, we talk to scholars and experts on the most influential ideas of HBR’s first 100 years. This week: disruptive innovation. With me to discuss it are Derek van Bever, senior lecturer and director of the Forum for Growth and Innovation at Harvard Business School, Rita McGrath, professor at Columbia Business School, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, professor at Harvard Business School. I’m Amy Bernstein, editor of Harvard Business Review and your host for this episode. Let’s set some context. Rita, what was our understanding of innovation before Clay gave us disruptive innovation?

RITA MCGRATH: Yeah. I think our common understanding of it was something that came out of R&D groups. It was like big product, big materials, big physical things, innovation. The classic would be like DuPont nylon. They invented this thing, that meant women didn’t have to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars collectively on silk stockings, and they had nylon riots. Literally, people were charging at these trucks with this revolutionary substance.

I think that’s how a lot of people still thought about innovation, is something that was very tech-heavy in the sense of not digital, but just technology that was coming out of R&D labs and so forth. That was one pervasive thought. I think the next pervasive thought was that innovations that were successful added something. They were new and improved, and so you built a better mouse trap. You built a better nylon stocking, you made Kevlar and things became impermeable, and that it was always at the top of the market.

I think that was one of the things that Clay’s work revealed, which was that innovation did not have to be new and improved or better on the existing dimension of merit, but that it could actually be worse on whatever it was we used to judge products by. But it did something else that was different.

AMY BERNSTEIN: You mentioned technology. Was technology always a necessary component of innovation as understood then?

RITA MCGRATH: I think in our theory of innovation it was. I think the idea of really business model innovation to me, did not become a common topic of conversation really until the ’90s. Prior to that, it was really product-centric, I would say, innovation. Peter Drucker and people like that, talked a little bit about things like the advent of the knowledge worker and what the network society was going to mean, and that kind of thing but that was really early days.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Felix, so help us understand Clay and what shaped his thinking. He was a co-founder of a technology company when he started to consider disruptive innovation. What shaped his thinking?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: We know Clay as a faculty member at Harvard Business School, of course, first and foremost. But actually, by the time he arrived and became a faculty member, he had done many different things already. He was a missionary in Korea, he studied in the US and in the UK. He had earned an MBA from HBS. Then in the 1980s, together with faculty members at MIT, he had started a company called Ceramics Process Systems. The one experience that he had as CEO of the company, was quite dramatic and in part informed his thinking about disruptive innovation.

The basic technology that they had came out of an MIT lab, and it was exactly what Rita had alluded to. It was this idea, is there a way to make what we have today, is there a way to make it better? To improve on the quality? In their case, they made ceramic substrate that could be used in microelectronics. This is a very, very thin layer of ceramic that has excellent properties when it comes to conducting heat and power. They had better ideas how to make that. The challenge was that the technology was not so easy to scale up.

They were about 14 months late or so later than they had anticipated. By that time, a competitor had essentially duplicated or had a product that was very similar, and the price premium that they expected to earn had vanished. In retrospect, I think looking back at this particular type of innovation, Clay later found in his dissertation that if you go directly against established incumbents, your chances of being successful are not all that great. He would say, “Well, maybe 5{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550}, 6{ac23b82de22bd478cde2a3afa9e55fd5f696f5668b46466ac4c8be2ee1b69550} of these attempts are successful, but mostly you shouldn’t really get your hopes high up.”

AMY BERNSTEIN: Derek, let me ask you about this idea that Felix just described. Had anyone ever noticed this before? Was it all that novel?

DEREK VAN BEVER: It was really remarkably creative, what he did. The question that consumed him was why is it that sometimes a tiny, little upstart can unseat a powerful, industry-leading incumbent? It was the sometimes that really intrigued him. He was looking for the causal driver, not merely correlation, but what was it that caused this phenomenon? There were lots of descriptive explanations that had been advanced in the past. One was that industry leaders would become self-satisfied and complacent, and not see the attacker coming.

Another was that if you got attacked on too many fronts at once, Xerox versus Canon, you couldn’t respond adequately. What bothered Clay was that while these explanations were often true enough, there were also a lot of anomalies, instances where they didn’t hold. Clay used these anomalies as learning opportunities, rather than exceptions. What he realized was if you can approach an incumbent in a way that causes them to ignore you or to flee upmarket, you have the thing you need the most, which is time to build a foundation underneath your business.

Then finally, he gave names to phenomena that were familiar, particularly to businesspeople. He called the trajectory of innovation that is far and away the most common, he called that sustaining innovation. Any company that wants to be in business for any length of time, had better be really good at that. He called that trajectory underneath the existing incumbents; he called that disruptive innovation. That’s what’s hard for incumbents to see, because it typically presents as products that aren’t as good, that aren’t interesting to their best customers. And therefore, are not something that they can allocate resource toward.

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: Or maybe if I can add a little twist to it. One of the things that I find most fascinating about the theory of disruption, is that it describes the reasons why the incumbent is unlikely to respond. For instance, because you have amazing margins with your best customers, and the incentive to serve a segment that doesn’t look very profitable to begin with, those incentives are just really muted.

Or you might have firm internal processes that make it really difficult to serve a new segment with much different demands in a way that seems both effective and eventually profitable. Even once you know about disruption, in part, it’s such a powerful idea because it speaks to the tendency not to respond. Even though from the outside it looks like you have all the resources, you have all the talent, you have everything that it would take to be responsive.

DEREK VAN BEVER: Felix, you’re reminding me, our colleague, Chet Huber, came into my office one day after I had been teaching in the course for a couple of years. He sat down in front of my desk and he said, “You do realize that this is a psychology course, right?” And boy, was that true.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Rita, Clay brought this idea to a much broader audience through HBR and through his book, The Innovator’s Dilemma. Tell us how that was received.

RITA MCGRATH: Well, I think before we get to Innovator’s Dilemma, let’s talk about “Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,” because that was the HBR article that preceded it. Everybody’s forgotten this now, but he co-wrote that with Joe Bower, Harvard’s own Joe Bower, who had written a whole series of books and articles, and research drafts on how fundamental the resource allocation process is to corporate decision-making of all kinds.

The original idea was to build on what Derek was saying, companies allocate resources according to a logic, and that logic is sometimes not necessarily in their own best interest. When the book came out, The Innovator’s Dilemma, that was in 1997. This is another thing we’ve all forgotten, which is it did not become a runaway best-seller right away. It took a couple of years.

And if memory serves me, it was a picture of Clay with Andy Grove of Intel on the front cover of a business magazine. I think it was Forbes. The two of them are on the front cover, and Grove basically saying, “I am changing the entire direction of my company because of Christensen’s theory.” That’s when it hit the masses.

AMY BERNSTEIN: That’s exactly when I remember becoming familiar with it for the first time. I’d forgotten that. Thank you for that. Felix, why do you think the idea struck a chord? Why did the book finally take off, the idea finally take off? What was happening at that time?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: When we think about the late 1990s today, of course, what we think of most commonly is that the dot-com bust when the bubble burst. But of course, before the bubble burst, there was a dot-com boom. There was a deep sense that technology would change things in really radical fashion. It’s not a coincidence that Andy Grove and companies like Intel were under the impression that the future could look radically different from the way the past had looked. That past success didn’t really guarantee much when it came to predicting future success.

Part of that, I think, is interlinked with the way the new technologies created network effects. The idea, that as my technology scales, as I get lots of customers, as I get broad adoption, the value of technology increases correspondingly. The personal computer, the early beginnings of the internet, everything spoke to technology and network effects, in particular, would become dominant features of the business landscape. Now, one thing that is true, if you operate in environments with very strong network effects, on the one hand, they’re a real formidable barrier to entry.

But just like they fuel growth and they can make you very successful in a short period of time if successfully challenged, you can then also lose everything in a very short period of time. Andy Grove’s famous management mantra that instructed everyone to be really paranoid, had in part to do with how technology changed and how technology gave rise to business network effects that created stability and instability at one and the same time. That was obviously fertile ground for a thinker who came along and said, “Well, it looks like you’re doing really well today, but actually your success today may hide in some sense, the undoing of your business in the future.”

AMY BERNSTEIN: Derek, was that paranoia that Andy Grove was pushing? Is that what made the idea so relevant to businesspeople or what was it that made it resonate?

DEREK VAN BEVER: Well, first, unlike many academics, Clay was himself a businessperson earlier in his career. He instinctively understood the relevance of his work to business leaders. He understood the angle at which a businessperson would approach a question. In fact, he was answering the question he had had when he left business to come to academia. He was also careful never to pretend that he knew more than his audience about their business.

In that famous encounter he had with Andy Grove, in which Andy Grove kept asking him to say, “What does disruption mean for Intel?” Clay said, “I’ll explain the theory of disruption to you, but you know your business better than I do. You’re the one who’s got to figure out what the implication is for Intel.” He famously said, “I would’ve been killed if I had tried to out Andy Grove, Andy Grove on what the implication of disruption was for Intel’s strategy.”

AMY BERNSTEIN: Rita, who was the first to embrace it? We know about Andy Grove, of course, but what industries, where did the uptake happen?

RITA MCGRATH: I think the uptake happened in industries that were being challenged so automotive, for example. The advent of really inexpensive but super, high-quality, smaller cars in the ’70s and ’80s, had completely freaked that industry out. They glommed onto this theory as, “Oh, they were low-featured, they weren’t as good on the dimensions of merit that we’d previously competed on.” But the disruption theory gave the incumbent Big Three car makers an out.

I think those kinds of industries, steel, automotive, where they felt that there were these things happening at the low ends of the market. I think the other thing that made it popular at the time was, and we’ve forgotten this now, but there was a time in American business where entrepreneurship meant you couldn’t get a real job. It was not the glam, cool thing. The guy you wanted to be was the guy in the gray flannel suit.

I would say beginning in the Reagan Administration mid-‘80s, and then leading up to the dot-com boom, that was really when entrepreneurship, the whole idea of startups, started to be something people took seriously. Before that, if you weren’t Ford or 3M or something, people didn’t really think about you as a force for change in the economy. I think that moved towards entrepreneurship.

I would put it to the rise of companies like Microsoft, where briefly, Bill Gates was the most valuable man in the world. It legitimated that whole field. Then following closely on the heels of that was this idea of corporate entrepreneurship, which is we need to be able to create new businesses from within, and then we need to be doing this continuously. We can’t just have one great idea and live on it for decades, no more.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Did everyone embrace this theory when it finally took off? Or were there some who said, “No, that’s not making sense”? Were there critics?

RITA MCGRATH: Oh, there always are. Oh, there always are. There’s always people that say, “Are you kidding? I’m, insert name of company. Gillette in razor blades, or Pepsi or Coke or these big franchises.” There’s always people that say, “Don’t be ridiculous. There’s no way some little fly-on-the-wall company is going to be able to attack us in any meaningful way.” There was a whole chunk of people who just didn’t buy it. What I would say, and I want to build on what Derek was saying, and to some extent Felix, it gave managers an explanation. It gave them an out.

It said, “You’re not a bad manager, because you’re attending to your best customers and you’re trying to go upmarket, and you’re trying to increase your margins. You’re trying to do all these things that all the business textbooks at the time said was the right thing to do.” It doesn’t mean you’re a bad manager, but you can still find yourself in trouble. I think it was that combination of providing an explanation for a phenomenon that had not gotten a lot of attention up to that point. But also giving people an out saying, “Oh, I was hit by the innovator’s dilemma. Nobody could have seen that coming.” Right?

DEREK VAN BEVER: Right.

AMY BERNSTEIN: But did it explain anything else, Felix? Were there any puzzling business behaviors or phenomena that this theory helped explain, other than the one that Rita just described?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: I think what Rita described is really the core of what was appealing, and it often came across as a puzzle ex post. Once you see that Netflix has successfully disrupted Blockbuster, then the big question, of course, is, “Oh my God, if Netflix saw this opportunity, why didn’t Blockbuster, in the beginning, have a DVD shipping service? Why didn’t they see the promise of the internet?” In some sense, the most popular version of the theory that often we couldn’t see it because no one knew that it would be so big.

There’s 15 ideas around the corner that go nowhere. How am I to pick the one that I should really pay attention to? That explanation is much more disquieting, I think, and hard to live with because it doesn’t really tell you what you can and what you cannot do. It replaced that with an explanation that said, “Yes. Of course, it’s bad luck someone else had a really promising idea, but your incentives were actually not to respond in the first place.” That’s exactly why disruption is something really powerful.

Because your systems are set up in a way, your incentives are set up in a way, that in the moment the company that seems to have all the resources, that seems to have all the capabilities to do something, that the disruptor often does—typically, not a great quality—why the incumbent wouldn’t really do that successfully.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Derek, let’s get into the criticism that the theory has drawn. There have been a few critics. Jill Lepore, the Harvard historian, most notably, who said that there really wasn’t enough evidence to justify the theory. Well, first of all, what’s your view of that? You worked very closely with Clay. How did he respond to that criticism?

DEREK VAN BEVER: Anyone who knew Clay, knows that he had a handmade sign in his office that said, “Anomalies Wanted.” And it’s true. One of the things that made him such a powerful thinker, was that he was so humble and so open to criticism. It wasn’t as if you spot something that the theory doesn’t cover and say the theory, therefore, is discredited. For Clay, that was for him a building block. Now, we get to dig in and make it better.

That disruption theory was still under construction, absolutely fit Clay’s worldview. It wasn’t so much that businesspeople criticized the theory. I think the academy had a really hard time with it, in part for the reason that Felix is mentioning. That people would say, “Sure, ex post, you can spot disruption, but can you spot it ex ante? Can you spot the areas where disruption prospectively is going to be operative?”

Work has been done on that, but that was very much out there. Then also, disruption is not built on a quantitative model, which is the coin of the realm today, of course, so it’s really hard to determine the boundary conditions. Anybody who’s done research on growth, you have to define what success and failure are, and there is no objective standard. You’ve got to figure out, “Okay, what’s the structure of the experiment?” And then run it.

I will always remember, I went to Clay once with what I thought was a really smart question. I said, “Clay, how can you tell when a disruptor becomes an incumbent?” He looked at me indulgently, and he said, “Derek, you do realize these are just constructs, right?” It was he had this revolutionary idea, but he also realized he’d given names to forces, and there was still so much to be discovered.

RITA MCGRATH: Yeah, and I’ll jump in on this. Very famously, he was wrong, by the way, about some of the top-of-the-line innovations. He very famously predicted that the iPhone would fail. One of the most profound critics of the theory of disruption is Safi Bahcall, who wrote a book called Loonshots. He’s biotech CEO, he’s a trained physicist, da, da, da, da, da. In his work, what he’s looking at are these unloved, crazy ideas that some passionate person is pushing.

So something like mRNA virus chains and discovery, all kinds of discoveries. He called them loonshots because it wasn’t obvious that they were economically viable. But his argument would be very often what turns into a disruptive technology, is actually a bunch of people pursuing what they think is a sustaining technology. It ends up through the twists and turns that discovery takes, it ends up actually being completely disruptive.

An example of that would be the invention of the microprocessor. The people that came up with that stuff, were actually looking for better vacuum tubes. They thought they were doing sustaining innovation, and it turned out to take them in a completely different direction. I think there is a nuance to this, which is separating out the intent of the people making these discoveries from the actual market consequences.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Felix, any thoughts?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: I always liked Clay’s distinction in the article that he wrote for Harvard Business Review in 2015, where he explains why Uber is not a disruptor in his view. First, the theory is not really built to explain which of the disruptors is going to be successful. Even if you expose, see the patterns, say, “Oh my God, that’s amazing what they did, because they went in at the low end and they had a really great idea. Ultimately, built an amazing business.”

There’s nothing in the theory that out of the hundreds of people that try to do this, who’s going to be successful and who’s not going to be successful. Then the second point that he makes in that article that I’ve always found very important, and often among the critics, I think poorly understood, is that there is a sense of when is it going to happen fast and when is it going to take a long time? But ultimately, there’s very little in the theory that would describe end states.

That is if you see a company, a big, large incumbent that gets disrupted, can you say anything about the eventual size of that organization? Can you say anything about the return on investor capital of that company? The answer is, by and large, no. It might be that the segment that they hold onto, perhaps it’s a sliver at the very high end of quality, where you have customers with very high willingness to pay.

You can maintain perhaps a smaller but a financially super, super successful business. The idea of being disrupted, is not so much the disruptor has to, I don’t know, go bankrupt. Or it’s like it’s only really disruption if it looks like Kodak.

DEREK VAN BEVER: Right.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Rita, what was it about the way that Clay communicated that helped spread his ideas?

RITA MCGRATH: That is such a good question because I have had so many conversations with my fellow innovation professors over the years, who would say things like, “I came up with the concept of, fill it in, ambidextrous innovation, the attacker’s advantage.” There’s a whole list of things, and they’re very miffed that, “Well, I came up with that and nobody paid any attention. Clay talks about it, and everybody thinks it’s the best thing since the miracle of bandwidth.” I think I’d point to three things, master storyteller, absolutely masterful storyteller.

When Clay illustrated a phenomenon, he used relatable examples. He used an interesting story, he used a twist, and people could see themselves in that story. Second thing he did, was he took ordinary things and made them really interesting. I’ll go back to one of his most famous parables ever, the parable of the milkshake. What’s the job a milkshake has to do for you? People would be listening to it going, “You know, you’re right. At lunchtime, I have a different job I need to be doing, than when I’m picking my kids up from school. Yes, I see that now.”

He had that way of making the ordinary seem really extraordinary. Then I think the third thing was he was genuinely interested in your response to what he had to say. Many professors, I won’t name names, but many professors are much more interested in you hearing what they have to say, than being interested in what you have to say. I think with Clay, it was always the other way around.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Coming up after the break, we’re going to explore how the common perception of disruption is drifted from its original meaning. What lessons are there for us today? Stay with us.

Welcome back to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Disruptive Innovation. I’m Amy Bernstein. Felix, let’s pull the camera back a little bit. How has Clay Christensen’s theory of disruption changed the way we think about strategy and competition?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: Well, in a way, the idea is almost a victim of its own success, so disruption is anywhere. In fact, the way most people use the word disruption these days has very little to do with Clayton’s idea. We come up with a new flavor for yogurt and people say, “Oh my God, the market for yogurt has been disrupted.” Despite that, I think it has done two things. The first is what Rita mentioned earlier, it’s given entrepreneurship a prominence.

It’s gone to a point now, when I tell my MBA students that most of the time, most innovation comes from large, established organizations, they look at me in complete disbelief. They actually don’t really think that large, incumbent organizations do anything that is all that innovative. It’s almost like the flip of what Rita described earlier, where we thought that, “Oh, if you’re an entrepreneur, you must be a loser.”

Now we’re giving, I think generally speaking, not enough credit to large companies and all the pretty amazing things that they do. One of the consequences of using disruption completely indiscriminately is that it’s now become synonymous with success. We look at Uber and they seem successful. Then we say, “Oh, the market for taxi services has been disrupted.” Success described in these very, very general terms I think is actually not very useful for setting strategy.

AMY BERNSTEIN: That’s interesting. If we now equate disruption with success, what about the other side of that, Rita? Can the theory of disruption be blamed for business failure? Can we say it’s brought down some companies, some firms?

RITA MCGRATH: I don’t know that the theory’s done that. It is possible to have badly managed firms in just about any circumstance. I think this builds on what Felix was saying. When the stories get told after the fact, we miss so much of what actually happened. What actually happened at Blockbuster was not the common mythology. The common mythology is Netflix emerged out of scorched earth and took the world by storm with CDs that you could mail in a red envelope. That is not true. Netflix in desperation, went to Blockbuster to try to be acquired.

They wanted to be Blockbuster’s online arm, and Blockbuster laughed at them. Literally laughed at them and said, “Get out of my office. What are you people? You’re a four-person dingbat operation, and we’re supposed to take you seriously?” That’s one of those stories that gets misunderstood. Kodak’s another one. The guy that sank Kodak had been running the printing business at HP. Lost out on the CEO race to run things at HP. And steered that company right over the cliff that was printing at home just at the moment that screens became possible, to be good enough to show pictures.

A lot of this stuff doesn’t really get remembered when we recall the stories. I don’t think the theory brings companies down. What I think brings companies down is the following: A failure to adequately balance today’s investments versus tomorrow’s. An unwillingness to make the financial and personnel commitments to little, new things. I see this all the time. You got your core business and it’s trundling along like an eight-lane highway. You got something with four people and a passionate advocate in charge of it, and it looks completely insignificant in the early stages.

When you think about why established companies get undone, it’s not because they didn’t make big, courageous moves, it’s because they didn’t allow the flourishing of lots of small, low-cost moves.

DEREK VAN BEVER: I completely agree with Rita. You can’t blame a theory for being explanatory. In fact, there has been research to try to validate the proposition that what disruption actually does through targeting non-consumption is to expand markets.

It may be that the providers of products and services change, revolve over time, but consumers benefit because there are more and more people who are available to consume products that are less expensive, more convenient, et cetera.

AMY BERNSTEIN: How has the theory evolved since it debuted, Felix?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: One of the really big additions was to distinguish between different types of disruption. We just talked earlier about the low-end entry, the low-end foothold that I think was very much on Clay’s mind when he first wrote about disruption. Toyota’s entry into the car market being one of the prominent examples. There wasn’t all that much in his ideas regarding competing against non-consumption. The idea you want to be that lower quality, lower priced version of something that we’re familiar with, or are you really competing for a segment that is not in the market at all?

Those differences turn out to be super, super important. In that sense, the theory has become richer. I think there’s also a little more of a sense that it’s not really a recipe. It’s not as though, “Oh, I follow this particular recipe and then I know I’m going to be successful.” We just know that the chances of entrepreneurs being successful are pretty low to begin with. Just like the probability of being disrupted if you’re a large and successful business are probably not all that large.

DEREK VAN BEVER: Could I add one thing to that? I completely agree that with Felix, that if you go back to [The Innovator’s] Dilemma, Clay was really describing one flavor of disruption at that time. Not new market disruption. But also, I think over time, you could see a shift in his language from talking about a disruptive technology to a disruptive positioning.

That it was really the creation of a new business model in all of its attributes. What’s the value proposition? What’s the profit formula, the capabilities, and priorities in that model? In fact, a technology can be shaped to be sustaining or disruptive. What is the model that’s being brought to market to compete with incumbents?

AMY BERNSTEIN: For the businesses that are trying to avoid being disrupted, Rita, what’s the best advice out there for them?

RITA MCGRATH: Well, you lift the lid off of any corporate portfolio, and it’s horrifying. What you see in there is somebody’s pet bunny from three CEOs ago and nobody said, “Why are we still doing that?” Or you’ve got these mission-critical, absolutely important projects that like half an intern is working on so you have this real disconnect.

DEREK VAN BEVER: These are the scars of a veteran, for sure!

RITA MCGRATH: I have been around the block on this. Anyway, then the last thing is your reward system. What do people believe they’re going to get rewarded for around here? One of the things that companies needed to do, if they’re going to avoid getting disrupted, you have to be in the game and you have to be willing to support small initiatives. There’s got to be some slack resource, there’s got to be the willingness to fund it. The number of times I have seen companies say, “Oh, we don’t want, we’re not going to be disrupted. We have this thing going on over here.”

No assumptions tested, no low-cost commitment tests. Big project teams with all the money in the world, on the assumption that they know what they’re doing and they don’t. There’s a real need for organizations that want to behave this way, to be willing to put some money behind what I call options. The idea of making a small investment today that could, not that will, but that could give you the right to create future choices. Companies that are going to be successful are going to get a lot smarter about that.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Well, let’s look at it from the other side, Derek. What’s the best advice for entrepreneurs or upstarts, who want to take advantage of disruptive innovation?

DEREK VAN BEVER: Yeah, pretty simple advice. Keep your cost structure low so that you’re able to exploit opportunities that are uninteresting to incumbents, too small, too remote, and target non-consumption. Don’t go after customers that they value, but rather go after segments that they’ve dismissed. The brass ring is if you can go after a segment that they’ve dismissed and they look at you and they go, “They just don’t understand this business.”

They let you grow a little bit and you get some success, and they look back at you a little bit later. And they go, “Oh, those poor dears. They just are not going to learn, are they?” Then they completely ignore you. That gives you the opportunity then to build from the bottom unmolested.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Felix, where does applying this theory most often go off the rails? Where are the difficulties in applying it?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: One difficulty for entrepreneurs is that it’s pretty difficult to distinguish non-consumption that actually has the promise from situations where there’s just no interest. You’re probably familiar with SimpliSafe, the home security company, I think is a beautiful example. Eleanor Laurans, one of the co-founders, she sits in Clay’s class. She literally goes out and tries to apply the theory thinking, “Why is there no home security for renters?”

How is it that leading company back then, that now ADT is serving homeowners, but renters are afraid maybe, or have a willingness to invest in home security as well. They built the company, literally built on the principles that she learned in the classroom. That yes, it’s a little less convenient, you don’t have someone who comes by your house and installs the equipment. You have to do that yourself, and so on, and so on. Then it turns out renters were just not really all that interested.

The fact that SimpliSafe is a very successful company today is just because a large fraction of homeowners actually found the value proposition of the company quite attractive. Distinguishing instances when you look at non-customers and what I tend to call near-customers, customers whose willingness to pay is in a useful vicinity, that turns out to be really difficult. Then for incumbent firms, I think one of the main difficulties is even if you’re successful at recognizing potential for disruption. Even if, as Rita suggested, you follow Clay’s advice and you set up a small group.

Typically, you take it out of the regular bureaucratic procedures, and you set it up as a separate entity, and they don’t have to worry about funding for a little while. We have lots and lots of examples where companies have done this successfully, where they build a shadow operation. Think Walmart, its online operations that get established, a million miles away, at least mentally, from Bentonville, in Silicon Valley, of course. Then there’s just no real way to bring that small, agile organization back and attach it to the supertanker.

You build something sort of interesting, sort of successful, but given the scale of the incumbent, it’s pretty meaningless. I think incubating new ideas, that’s what many incumbents are quite good at. But marrying these ideas back to the supertanker that has been on a set course for a long period of time, I think that remains extraordinarily challenging, with not that many examples of companies that have done this successfully.

DEREK VAN BEVER: Felix, you’re reminding me, Clay, when he was in the classroom, he would take that big index finger of his and he would go, “Where do you stick it?”

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: Yeah.

DEREK VAN BEVER: His frustration was that companies would always try to stick it underneath the division that it is effectively disrupting. You know how that story ends, right?

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: Yes.

DEREK VAN BEVER: Where it’s, “Oh, we’ll take care of this. Don’t worry, we’ll make sure that this grows just as fast as it should.” That’s often the last that you hear from it.

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: Yeah. But then his view that simple organizational separation will lead to long-term success, that I think has not really been true for many companies either. I think that’s a really important question. Then the second, if you see disruption, if you think it’s going to happen, how good are you going to be? What are the chances that that’s a game that you can play successfully? Think of the large energy companies right now.

Most of them are making some investments in renewables, and we already see quite interesting dividing lines. Some of them being good at it, and some of them basically wasting money that doesn’t seem to have much of a payoff. Disruption itself implies that it’s almost costless to respond. But in the end, there’s capital, there’s talent, there’s attention that is required, if in fact, you want to be building something successful.

In an environment where entrepreneurship and the opportunity cost of trying new things are typically downplayed or are seen as very low, I tend to remind my students that the opportunity costs of trying to play yet another game, they can be quite sizable.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Let me throw out a question to the whole group here. Where do you all think our understanding of disruptive innovation is headed? What future are we looking at? I’ll go around the horn here. I’ll start with you, Rita.

RITA MCGRATH: Sure. What I’m encouraged by is when Clay and I were working together in the ’90s, we’d never actually wrote a paper together, we co-presented a lot of stuff, but not co-authored. But anyway, we were talking about this in the ’90s, and we would be like the only people in the room talking about these phenomena, and people would look at us as though we had two heads—or four heads I guess, between the two of us. Because I was talking about, “Well, you need to plan differently when you don’t have data.”

Clay was talking about, “Well, this little upstart could cause you problems, if the right circumstances prevailed.” I think what’s happened in the intervening decades, is people are now aware. People are now willing to say older models of strategy don’t apply, that newer models really make a difference. That is a far cry from being able to put that awareness into systemic action. I think what we’ve made a lot of progress on is the conversations are different.

There’s a lot more knowledge that there’s more to life than just sustaining innovations. That there are these phenomena we need to pay attention to. I think awareness is where we are. I think the next big chasm to be crossed is how do we now put that in practice in the management structures that we use to run large, complex corporations? There is so much knowledge about how you build innovation capability, how you build disruptive potential, how you actually make these things happen.

And yet, most managers aren’t taught it. If you think about the lifecycle of a competitive advantage, it has to come from somewhere. It has to come from an innovation or an invention, or an idea or something. Then you have to scale it, which is getting it into the business. Then you have this delightful period of exploitation, where you get to enjoy the fruits of your labor. That’s what we teach people. We don’t also teach them about what happens when the shoe has turned, the thing’s gone obsolete. Your 386 microprocessor is no longer the state-of-the-art. How do you now reconfigure your company to take advantage of the next new thing? Those are skills were not yet mainstream.

DEREK VAN BEVER: Yeah.

AMY BERNSTEIN: Derek?

DEREK VAN BEVER: Yeah. Going back to an aside I made a while ago, that when Chet said, “You know this is a psychology course, right?” It is interesting that 27 years after the publication of that book, we’re still bound to get caught up in this phenomenon. To pick up on what Rita said, I think we are going to understand more about how to respond to the phenomenon of disruption as incumbent companies. We’ll understand the different rate at which it works its way through industries.

Fifty years in steel, seemingly overnight in education, and we’ll understand more the importance of the performance metrics that we honor. What would’ve happened if US Steel had measured not gross margin, but net profit dollars per ton? Would they have abandoned such a huge swath of the steel market and imagined that they were doing the right thing? I think we’ll get better at continuing to tease out this puzzle of how do we confront our own cognitive weaknesses and blind spots and respond with more alacrity, more quickly and more effectively?

AMY BERNSTEIN: Last word to you, Felix.

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE: I think to me, one of the really big changes in technology in the economy today, is the ease with which companies can produce high-quality services and products at incredibly low cost. Remember, part of the dilemma for the incumbent, comes from the fact that you’re serving customers who have very high demands. And the implication was you, as a result, have very high cost. That makes it basically impossible for you to respond. Now today, we see so many companies that have amazing quality and a cost advantage at one and the same time.

This old notion in strategy of being stuck in the middle when you try to be both high quality and low cost, and then you end up being not really high quality because you’re thinking about cost. You end up not being really low-cost because you’re thinking about quality as well. This notion of “stuck in the middle,” to the extent that it doesn’t really apply, frees up incumbents to respond in a much more flexible manner to serious threats of disruptors.

Then it struck me as interesting, even in today’s conversation—I know I’m guilty of it myself—how many of our examples are product related? Well, what about services? In services, it’s almost true by definition that you get fabulous service from engaged employees. And the moment you have highly productive, highly engaged employees, you have this interesting combination of having a potential cost advantage that comes from high productivity. The very same ingredient that produces your cost advantage now produces your ability to satisfy even the most demanding customers.

That, to me, is a change that doesn’t say, “Oh, if I’m an entrepreneur, I shouldn’t use disruptive innovation as my guideposts, where to enter, how to develop my business.” But it says that the balance of who’s going to be successful and how easy it will be to disrupt large organizations, that balance is going to change over time in favor of large incumbents. The very formidable difficulties of disrupting their businesses.

AMY BERNSTEIN: That’s Derek van Bever and Felix Oberholzer-Gee of Harvard Business School, and Rita McGrath of Columbia Business School.

Next time in 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: shareholder value. HBR editor in chief Adi Ignatius talks to three experts about the practice of making shareholders the chief priority for a company, for better and for worse. That’s next Thursday, right here in the HBR IdeaCast feed after the regular Tuesday episode.

This episode was produced by Curt Nickisch. We get technical help from Rob Eckhardt. Our audio product manager is Ian Fox, and Hannah Bates is our audio production assistant. Special thanks to Maureen Hoch. Thanks for listening to 4 Business Ideas That Changed the World, a special series of the HBR IdeaCast. I’m Amy Bernstein.

4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Trailer

4 Business Ideas That Changed the World: Trailer
September 29, 2022

Influential company and management concepts have incredible affect over us. Like it or not, they form how organizations are run and how people today all around the earth shell out their days. And Harvard Enterprise Overview has launched and distribute lots of of these consequential tips considering that its founding in 1922.

HBR IdeaCast is taking this 100th anniversary to talk to: how have these strategies transformed our lives? And wherever are they having us in the long term? Every Thursday in October, the podcast feed will attribute a bonus series: 4 Business Suggestions That Changed the Entire world.

Just about every week, a distinctive HBR editor talks to earth-course students and gurus on influential business enterprise and management thoughts of HBR’s initially 100 yrs: disruptive innovation, scientific management, shareholder price, and emotional intelligence.

Pay attention to the discussions to better realize our get the job done daily life, how considerably it is occur, and how much it nonetheless has to go.

Davos is back and the world has changed. Have the global elite noticed?

Davos is back and the world has changed. Have the global elite noticed?

Much more than two several years later on, the planet has been upended by the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But for the loaded and strong arriving in Davos, Switzerland for the Planet Financial Forum, very tiny has altered.

“Davos is the epitome of one of the greatest challenges to society right now, which is self-congratulatory elites,” stated Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, a Yale management professor who speaks often with numerous perfectly-known executives.

The conference — which famously combines high-minded panels with flashy get-togethers — aims to deliver vital people jointly to tackle urgent problems like inequality, local weather transform, the long run of technologies and geopolitical conflict. But the logic behind inviting some of the wealthiest people on Earth to clear up these troubles from a vacation resort town appears to be even shakier these times.

Billionaires included $5 trillion to their fortunes for the duration of the pandemic, according to a report from Oxfam released in January. The world’s richest 10 males noticed their collective wealth much more than double in between March 2020 and November 2021. Meanwhile, tens of thousands and thousands far more people all over the earth were being pushed into serious poverty as the international overall economy shut down, and numerous having difficulties households became reliant on emergency governing administration support.

“The last two decades have dramatized and clarified what has been accurate for some time now, which is an elite plutocratic course is not just leaving the rest of the entire world driving, but is thriving exactly by stepping on the necks of everyone else,” reported Anand Giridharadas, author of the reserve “Winners Choose All: The Elite Charade of Switching the Entire world.”

This year’s economic sector offer-off has hit the ultra-rich. But that will not likely serve as a lot consolation to individuals in both of those designed and several acquiring economies going through the worst price tag-of-living crises in many years. Soaring food stuff and fuel prices are already causing hunger and hardship, fanning instability, triggering protests and emboldening political insurgents.
The 2022 discussion board was to begin with scheduled for January, but it was postponed immediately after the outbreak of the Omicron variant. And when organizers have cobbled collectively a delayed springtime version that they hope will continue being related, several weighty hitters have scheduling conflicts or are opting out.
JPMorgan Chase (JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon, who qualified prospects America’s most important bank, will never show up at the function, which coincides with the firm’s yearly investor working day presentation. US President Joe Biden — who delivered a major speech at Davos in 2017 — will be wrapping up a excursion to South Korea and Japan. China’s existence is a great deal lessened, with its big metropolitan areas still gripped by Covid-19 and its tech titans lying minimal.

The most important party is very likely to be a speech on Monday by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is envisioned to participate via videoconference. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Fee President Ursula von der Leyen are also scheduled to supply addresses afterwards in the 7 days, which will be scrutinized as EU nations battle to agree on a formal oil embargo towards Russia.

In the earlier, Russian politicians and oligarchs had been a fixture of Davos. Founder Klaus Schwab has long emphasized that dialogue and further financial ties can advertise peace amongst political adversaries.

President Vladimir Putin shipped a speech at a digital edition of the Entire world Economic Discussion board just very last yr, and was invited to discuss to attendees in 2015 following Russia annexed Crimea.

“At this second in history exactly where the world has a one of a kind and brief window of option to shift from an age of confrontation to an age of cooperation, the means to listen to your voice — the voice of the president of the Russian Federation — is necessary,” Schwab stated when introducing Putin in 2021.

In 2020, the CEOs of Lukoil, Sberbank and Yandex have been on the list of attendees, together with the country’s strength minister.

This calendar year, Putin would not be attending. Nor will any Russian officers, magnates or executives. Fairly, the plan options conversations on troubles this sort of as “Chilly War 2.” and the “Return to War.”

Adtalem Global Education Inc. — Moody’s affirms Adtalem’s B1 CFR; outlook changed to positive

Adtalem Global Education Inc. — Moody’s affirms Adtalem’s B1 CFR; outlook changed to positive

Rating Action: Moody’s affirms Adtalem’s B1 CFR; outlook changed to positiveGlobal Credit Research – 10 Mar 2022New York, March 10, 2022 — Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) affirmed Adtalem Global Education Inc.’s (“Adtalem”) B1 corporate family rating (“CFR”) and its B1-PD probability of default rating (“PDR”). The company’s senior secured first lien credit facility, which includes an $850 million term loan facility due 2028 and a $400 million revolving credit facility expiring in 2026, was also affirmed at B1, and its $800 million senior secured notes due 2028 was also affirmed at B1. The speculative grade liquidity rating was maintained at SGL-1. The outlook was changed to positive from stable.Today’s rating action is driven by Adtalem’s announcement it intends to repay approximately $770 million of debt from the expected $820 million in net proceeds from the pending divestiture of the financial services segment, which is expected to close by March 31, 2022. Debt is expected to be paid down approximately 30 days after transaction close.Governance considerations are a driver for this rating action due to the meaningful amount of debt paydown expected from the financial services segment divestiture. Adtalem’s credit metrics will considerably improve from the debt paydown. Leverage as of December 31, 2021 was 4.3x, and pro-forma for the financial services divestiture, unrealized synergies from the Walden University (“Walden”) acquisition and the expected debt paydown, Moody’s estimates leverage improves to about 2.5x. Excluding unrealized synergies, leverage increases to about 2.8x. Adtalem should also realize approximately $40 million of annualized interest expense savings which strengthens its liquidity profile and improves its interest coverage and cash flow metrics. Moody’s expects student enrollment declines to persist through at least Adtalem’s fiscal year 2022 largely driven by headwinds related to the coronavirus pandemic, which will increase leverage. While Adtalem is strongly positioned to capture high employment demand over the next several years in the nursing, medical and veterinary fields, there is uncertainty as to when Adtalem will return to sustained enrollment growth.All financial metrics cited reflect Moody’s standard adjustments unless otherwise noted.Affirmations:..Issuer: Adtalem Global Education Inc….. Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B1-PD…. Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B1….Senior Secured 1st Lien Term Loan B, Affirmed B1 (LGD3)….Senior Secured 1st Lien Revolving Credit Facility, Affirmed B1 (LGD3)….Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1 (LGD3)Outlook Actions:..Issuer: Adtalem Global Education Inc…..Outlook, Changed To Positive From StableRATINGS RATIONALEAdtalem’s B1 CFR reflects Adtalem’s track record of good financial performance at its for-profit medical, veterinary, and nursing programs while operating in a challenging higher education regulatory environment, good free cash flow generation, and very good liquidity profile. The rating is constrained by Adtalem’s substantial regulatory requirements for operating for-profit higher education businesses, integration and execution risks associated with the Walden acquisition, and Moody’s expectation that Adtalem will prioritize using free cash flow to repurchase shares over the next three years over voluntary debt repayment, limiting leverage from meaningfully decreasing. The rating is also constrained by enrollment declines that have occurred since its September 2021 quarter which Moody’s expects to continue at least through fiscal year 2022.The SGL-1 rating reflects Moody’s expectation that liquidity will be very good over the next 12 to 18 months supported by pro-forma cash balances of about $325 million as of December 31, 2021 and strong free cash flow generation. Amortization payments on the term loan are expected to be fully satisfied due to the anticipated sizable repayment of the term loan. The company’s $400 million revolving credit facility expires in 2026. With the exception of an $84 million letter of credit assumed by Adtalem which allows Walden to participate in Title IV programs, Moody’s does not expect Adtalem to draw on the revolver. Within its most recent 10-K, Adtalem noted that it expected its composite score to fall below 1.5 for its fiscal year 2022 financial responsibility test, which may result in additional letters of credit to continue participating in Title IV programs. The revolver contains a maximum total net leverage ratio covenant that cannot exceed 4x until December 31, 2023 and steps down to 3.25x thereafter. Moody’s expects the company to maintain ample cushion under its financial covenant. Alternate liquidity is limited as the company’s credit facilities are secured by a first-priority lien on substantially all tangible and intangible assets.Debt capital is comprised of the company’s senior secured first lien credit facility, which includes an $850 million term loan facility due 2028 and a $400 million revolving credit facility expiring in 2026, and $800 million senior secured notes due 2028. The B1 credit facility and senior secured notes ratings, the same as the B1 CFR, reflect the preponderance of debt represented by the credit facility and notes. The senior secured notes and first lien credit facilities have a first lien priority on substantially all assets of the combined company. While the mix of the expected $770 million debt paydown between the term loan and the senior secured notes is not yet known, it will have no impact on the individual instrument ratings given that the credit facility and senior secured notes are ranked pari passu.The positive outlook reflects Moody’s expectation that Adtalem will return to student enrollment growth in fiscal year 2023, generate free cash flow to debt at least in the high single digit percentage range, and successfully integrate Walden into its operations.FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGSThe ratings could be upgraded if Adtalem returns to and maintains strong student enrollment growth and if leverage decreases and is sustained below 2.75x while the company maintains balanced financial policies and a very good liquidity profile.Adtalem’s ratings could be downgraded if leverage is sustained above 4x, if enrollments meaningfully decline, its liquidity position meaningfully deteriorates, or if the company encounters any substantial challenges in integrating Walden with its operations. A downgrade may also be warranted if unanticipated regulatory challenges result in sizeable litigation expenses, ineligibility for Title IV funding or the removal of accreditation to one of the company’s learning institutions.Headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, Adtalem Global Education Inc. is a global provider of educational services with a focus on Medical and Healthcare. The company operates five educational institutions across the US and Caribbean. Pro-forma for the financial services segment divestiture, revenue totaled approximately $1.1 billion for the last twelve months ended December 31, 2021.The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and Consumer Services published in November 2021 and available at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_1287897. 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Further information on the EU endorsement status and on the Moody’s office that issued the credit rating is available on www.moodys.com.The Global Scale Credit Rating on this Credit Rating Announcement was issued by one of Moody’s affiliates outside the UK and is endorsed by Moody’s Investors Service Limited, One Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London E14 5FA under the law applicable to credit rating agencies in the UK. Further information on the UK endorsement status and on the Moody’s office that issued the credit rating is available on www.moodys.com.Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody’s legal entity that has issued the rating.Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating. Sean Cray Analyst Corporate Finance Group Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 250 Greenwich Street New York, NY 10007 U.S.A. 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